The Iowa Supreme Court has clarified the boundaries of immunity under the state’s Domesticated Animal Activities Act, vacating an appellate court decision and affirming the dismissal of an $18.2 million personal injury lawsuit.
In Shafer v. Santana, No. 24-1939 (Iowa Sup. Ct. June 12, 2026), a unanimous Court held that the Act's immunity for an owner "driving" a domesticated animal harnessed to nonmotorized equipment continues to apply even when the owner briefly dismounts to attend to the equipment. Additionally, the Court ruled that the plaintiff's expert report, despite detailing unsafe practices and mechanical deficiencies, demonstrated at most the defendant’s ordinary negligence and did not establish the recklessness required to defeat the immunity granted by Iowa Code section 673.2.
Background Facts
The lawsuit arises from a severe accident on a Madison County pasture on September 1, 2021. The property owner and defendant, Frank Santana, was using a team of draft horses to pull an antique, nonmotorized sickle mower while plaintiff Janey Shafer filmed him. After Santana finished mowing, he dismounted and instructed Shafer to hold the horses by a lead rope while he attempted to raise the heavy sickle bar.
For reasons the plaintiff conceded were unknown, the sickle bar abruptly dropped to the ground. The crash of the bar spooked the horses, causing them to suddenly reverse and then bolt forward as Shafer struggled to hold them. Shafer was knocked down, run over by the mower's steel wheel, and dragged several feet.
This incident resulted in permanent, life-altering injuries: Shafer sustained catastrophic spinal cord trauma that left her paralyzed from the waist down. Her extensive recovery process included two weeks in intensive care and three months at a rehabilitation facility in Colorado, accruing medical expenses exceeding $700,000. Shafer subsequently filed a personal injury action against Santana, seeking $18.2 million in damages.
Procedural History
The Madison County District Court granted Santana summary judgment, holding that Santana was shielded from liability under the Domesticated Animal Activities Act.[i] Shafer appealed, arguing that (1) the Act does not apply because Santana was not engaged in a “domesticated animal activity” occurring at the time of the injury; and (2) alternatively, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Santana’s actions meet the “recklessness” exception to immunity. The Iowa Court of Appeals found that the Act applied to the instant case, but departed from the district court in ruling that a “lingering question of fact” existed on whether the incident met the Act’s exception for reckless conduct. The Iowa Supreme Court granted Santana’s ensuing request for further review.
The appeal presented two questions to the Supreme Court:
- Is a defendant operating a horse-drawn sickle mower engaged in the "domesticated animal activity" of "driving" under Iowa Code § 673.1(3)(a) and § 673.2 when the injury-producing accident occurred while the defendant had exited the mower and the horses were at a brief standstill?
- In a motion for summary judgment, does an expert witness statement detailing mechanical failures, improper safety practices, and inadequate animal training in a defendant’s operation of a horse-drawn implement create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the "recklessness" exemption to statutory immunity under the Domesticated Animal Activities Act?
Supreme Court Analysis
Statutory Immunity for “Driving” a Domesticated Animal
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Susan Christensen, the Court began by addressing the applicability of statutory immunity to the present case. Under Iowa law, a domesticated animal owner's conduct qualifies for immunity from tort pursuant to the Domesticated Animal Activities Act (Iowa Code § 673 et seq.) if the injured party is a "participant" or "spectator" and the injury results from the "inherent risks of a domesticated animal activity."[ii] The Act exclusively identifies fourteen activities as a “domesticated animal activity”; this case focuses on the category of “riding or driving a domesticated animal.”[iii]
The Court explained that "driving" is an industry term of art describing the continuous control of an equine harnessed to a nonmotorized vehicle rather than a generic dictionary definition. In this context, because the horses remained fully harnessed to the mower and Santana only paused to secure the implement before driving them back to the barn to be unhitched, the Court reasoned that the entire sequence belonged to a unified activity of "driving." Furthermore, because Shafer was positioned in the immediate vicinity of this operation, the Court classified her as a "spectator" exposed to the inherent and unpredictable risks of animal behavior, i.e., a horse spooking at a sudden, loud noise.
The Expert Report and Standard for Recklessness
Shafer argued in the alternative that, under Iowa Code § 673.2(1), Santana's conduct falls outside the Act's immunity because it rose to the level of recklessness. To support this argument, Shafer presented an expert report from Everett Kenoyer, an 82-year-old expert with seven decades of experience operating draft horses and sickle mowers.[iv] Kenoyer opined that Santana’s operation was "dangerous and unsafe" due to a series of failures:
- The sickle mower was excessively rusty, and the safety rod was not properly secured with its wing nut.
- The horses did not possess sufficient training to pull a sickle mower safely.
- Santana directed an inexperienced person to hold the horses from the front rather than securing them from behind.
The Court emphasized that proving recklessness requires meeting a high threshold—an “intentionally performed act of an unreasonable character” executed “in disregard of a known risk or risk so obvious that the actor should have known of it” that makes harm highly probable.[v] Recklessness may be shown either under a subjective standard (the defendant actually knew of the risk) or an objective standard (the risk was so obvious that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have known of it). Though the Court acknowledged that expert testimony can establish recklessness, precedent typically limits its use to demonstrating that a defendant knowingly and subjectively disregarded a risk.
Using these standards, the Court held that the evidence presented by Shafer failed to cross the threshold from ordinary negligence into recklessness. The Court found the record entirely devoid of evidence that Santana consciously disregarded any danger. It highlighted that Santana was never deposed and that Kenoyer’s report did not claim Santana intentionally disregarded the risks of operating the sickle mower. Feld v. Borkowski illustrates the contrast: there, an expert’s analysis of a softball bat’s irregular flight path supported an inference that the defendant had knowingly ignored an obvious danger.[vi]
Because Santana lacked advanced, specialized training in operating a sickle mower, the hazards Kenoyer identified weren't obvious enough to impute knowledge of them to an ordinary operator. While Kenoyer’s report outlined a potential case for ordinary, "garden-variety" negligence, it did not demonstrate the extreme departure from care required to prove recklessness.
Acknowledging that the ruling yields an undeniably "harsh" outcome for an individual facing catastrophic injuries, the Court concluded that the judiciary is bound to respect the explicit policy choices enacted by the legislature. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' reversal was vacated, and the District Court's dismissal of the $18.2 million suit was affirmed.
Observations
Evidence Needed to Show Recklessness
This case underscores a fatal evidentiary gap—the lack of proof showing subjective intent, an absence the Court traced directly to plaintiff's failure to depose the defendant. In proving recklessness, a plaintiff should not rely solely on expert declarations to impute intent to a lay operator. Instead, counsel should build the record around evidence bearing directly on the defendant's own state of mind, such as deposition testimony probing what the defendant actually knew, admissions or prior statements acknowledging a known hazard, and any history of similar near-misses or complaints that would put a reasonable operator on notice. Without evidence establishing what the defendant subjectively understood and chose to ignore, piercing Chapter 673 immunity represents a steep uphill battle for plaintiffs.
A Broader Practical Shield for “Driving” Animals
For owners of working animals, the Court's adoption of an industry-specific definition of “driving” meaningfully broadens immunity's practical reach. By treating a brief pause to secure equipment as part of a continuous driving activity, rather than a discrete interruption that suspends protection, the Court foreclosed the argument that immunity only attaches while the animal is in active motion. Left unaddressed, that argument would have created a gap in coverage every time an owner stopped to adjust tack, clear an obstruction, or attend to the implement. Owners operating horse-drawn equipment can take some comfort that routine, incidental stops won't be carved out of the activity's protection.
[i] Summary judgment is a procedural mechanism designed to enable a party to obtain a court judgment promptly and without the expense of a trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact and, even in viewing the evidence most favorably towards the nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981.
[ii] Iowa Code § 673.2
[iii] Iowa Code § 673.1(3)
[iv] Interestingly, Kenoyer's report was unsworn, which would normally preclude its consideration on summary judgment. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5) (requiring affidavits to be sworn or otherwise certified under penalty of perjury). The Court nonetheless considered it because Santana did not challenge its form and Kenoyer testified at deposition that he would reaffirm all of his written opinions at trial.
[v] Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC, 30 N.W.3d 724 (Iowa 2026) (quoting Martinez v. State, 986 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Iowa 2023)).
[vi] See Feld v. Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72, 80–81 (Iowa 2010).