The case is Jeffery Haw and Shirlee Haw v. City of Cresco, No. 24-1543 (Iowa Ct. App July 23, 2025).
In 2001, Jeffrey and Shirlee Haw purchased a 32-acre property near Cresco, Iowa, with an easement over two adjacent City-owned lots (Lots 1 and 5) to access their land. The original easement allowed access solely for farming purposes, but it was later amended to permit access "for any purpose and without any restriction or limitations." For 20 years, the Haws used the easement for activities such as timber harvesting, hiking, and storing equipment, enjoying unrestricted access.
In 2022, the City replaced its fence surrounding a wastewater treatment facility, thereby reducing the Haws’ access points along the shared boundary. The City contended that the new fencing was necessary for facility security and operations. The Haws, in contrast, argued that the fence unreasonably restricted their easement rights, increased potential development costs, and limited access to trails and timber. Although approximately seventy feet of open access remained along the shared property line, the district court found that this access was sufficient and dismissed the Haws’ claim. The Haws appealed.
The appellate court focused on the interpretation of the amended easement language—specifically, whether the phrase “for any purpose and without restriction or limit” obligated the City to leave the entire shared boundary unobstructed, or merely required the City to permit reasonable access to the Haws’ property. The court acknowledged two plausible interpretations of the easement language:
“The amended easement grants the Haws permission ‘to enter upon and to cross over’ the City’s lots in order ‘to gain access’ to their land ‘for any purpose and without any restriction or limitations.’ The latter clause—‘for any purpose and without any restriction or limitations’—could be read to qualify either (1) the words ‘to enter upon and to cross over’ or (2) the words ‘to gain access.’ The first reading supports the Haws’ argument, while the second favors the City’s. Both are reasonable under the ordinary tools of interpretation.”
To resolve the ambiguity, the court turned to evidence of the parties’ intent at the time the easement was drafted. Central to this inquiry was the testimony of Attorney Joseph Braun, who originally drafted the easement. Braun testified that the language was intended to be broad, allowing the Haws to use various types of machinery and engage in diverse activities on their property. However, he clarified that it was never the parties' intent to guarantee access at every point along the property line shared with the City.
Both the district court and the appellate court found Braun’s testimony persuasive. Combined with the fact that approximately seventy feet of open access remained, the court concluded that the Haws continued to enjoy access that was “reasonably necessary and convenient for the purposes for which [the easement] was created” (internal citation omitted).
Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the City was not obligated to maintain unobstructed access along the entire boundary but was instead required only to ensure reasonable access in accordance with the easement’s purpose and the original intent of the parties.