
The liability of landowners or possessors of real property for injuries suffered by third party entrants has traditionally depended upon the benefit that the entrant bestowed upon the owner or possessor. The law in most jurisdictions creates a hierarchy of status approach that bases liability on the status of the entrant. Under this approach, the adult trespasser is given the lowest status, while child trespassers and invitees are given the highest status. Mid-level status is given to social guests. The Iowa Supreme Court was recently presented with the issue of whether to retain the Court’s traditional distinction between an invitee and a licensee in premises liability cases. The Court has historically followed the hierarchy of status approach, but has now changed its mind, claiming that the distinction (just like they ruled concerning traditional marriage) is outdated.
Here, a mother filed a premises liability claim against her son for injuries she sustained from tripping over a vacuum hose while cleaning his home when he was ill. The mother alleged that her son’s negligent conduct caused her permanent injuries, pain and suffering, loss of function, and medical costs. The son denied his own negligence and claimed, in fact, that his mother had acted negligently in failing to remove the impediment. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the son. However, the mother asked for a new trial, because the court had failed to properly instruct the jury on negligence (the court had used stock jury instructions explaining premises liability under the traditional hierarchy approach.) The trial court did not grant a new trial, stating that Iowa’s appellate courts had not yet changed the law in this area and the old jury instructions would continue to be used until the courts got rid of the distinction between licensees and invitees.
On appeal, the court addressed the rationale and origin behind distinguishing between invitees and licensees, stating that the hierarchical system was based upon feudal law dating back to an era when land ownership was the primary source of power and wealth. The system, according to the court, arose in a time where courts were hesitant to accept that a person should be held responsible for damages he could foresee. The trend in other American appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court, has been to abandon the hierarchical approach, with these courts claiming that the distinction is outdated and lends itself to confusion and an unjust outcome. Some courts have abandoned the hierarchical approach altogether, but some courts have chosen only to abandon the distinction between invitees and licensees. However, the courts that have abandoned the hierarchical approach are still the minority.
The Court then reviewed past case law, noting that the Court had been split for a number of years on whether to retain the distinction. According to the court, abolishing the distinction between invitees and licensees allows juries more discretion and turns the focus of the proceedings to whether the injury was foreseeable. The Court, in passing, noted that, in their view, property owners do not alter their behavior based upon the type of entrant to the property. The Court noted that, too often, juries were left in confusion, focusing not on the act itself, but the status of the entrant to the property.
Thus, the court decided, in this case, that the value of doing away with the traditional distinction between invitees and licensees far outweighed the value of retaining it. The Court adopted a multifactor approach. Under that approach, the jury is instructed to decide whether the landowner has exercised reasonable care in protecting lawful visitors. The jury will use these factors to come to a decision- whether the potential harm was foreseeable, the purpose and circumstances by which the entrant entered the property, the use the premises was to be put to, the reasonableness of the inspection, repair and warning by the landowner, the opportunity to give warning or repair, and the burden on the land owner in terms of cost and inconvenience in providing protection.
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for a new trial with a new set of jury instructions consistent with the new approach. So, while the Court pontificated about the need to abolish the rule due to “jury confusion,” it then set up a system under which juries will have to weigh multiple factors to determine if reasonable care has been exercised under all the circumstances. Whether the new approach will be less confusing to juries remains to be seen. What appears certain, however, is the uncertainty that the Court has injected into premises liability cases. The result will likely be more cases filed- a bonanza for plaintiffs’ trial lawyers and insurance companies. Koenig v. Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 2009).