Overview
While admitting some “judicial discomfort” with undue influence claims in general, the Iowa Supreme Court reaffirmed that a plaintiff need only prove an undue influence claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” rather than by a “clear and convincing” standard. The Court ruled, however, that a plaintiff must meet a “heightened substantive standard” by proving that the disputed result was “clearly” brought about by undue influence. The Court found that this heightened substantive requirement did not irreconcilably conflict with the general preponderance of the evidence standard.
Facts of the Case
The case arose after a 98-year-old father revised his revocable trust six days before his death. With the revision, the decedent’s son (the defendant in the case) was named as a 50 percent beneficiary of the decedent’s estate. The decedent made the revision after the defendant traveled from California to Iowa and conversed with his father regarding the trust. After the father’s death, the plaintiff son, who had originally been the primary beneficiary of the trust, sued his brother alleging that the trust modification was the result of undue influence. The district court combined two Iowa Civil Jury Instructions to charge the jury as follows:
In order for [the plaintiff] to prevail on his claim of undue influence, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at or about the time the trust provisions were changed, all of the following circumstances existed:
1. [the decedent] was susceptible to the type of influence described in Paragraph 4 of this instruction.
2. [the defendant] had the opportunity to exercise such influence over [the decedent].
3. [the defendant] was inclined to influence [the decedent] for purposes of gaining favor.
4. [the defendant] assumed a position of dominance over [the decedent’s] decision to the extent that the decision to change the trust provisions was [the defendant’s] decision rather than [the decedent’s] decision.
5. The changes made to the trust provisions were clearly the result of the foregoing circumstances.
Analysis by the Court
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the jury instruction was improper. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for a new trial. The defendant brother appealed, and the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinstating the jury verdict and the district court’s judgment.
Citing the danger inherent in undue influence litigation that fact finders may be tempted not to focus on the free will of the testator, but rather on their own values or senses of propriety, the Court noted that courts have long “struggled with the concept of undue influence.”
The Court stated, however, that Iowa courts had long applied a preponderance of the evidence—rather than a clear and convincing evidence—standard to such claims. The Court found that any confusion regarding this standard was ended when the Supreme Court in In re Estate of Todd, 585 N.W.2d 273, 275-77 & n.2 (Iowa 1998), explicitly disavowed a heightened standard of proof for undue influence claims in will contests not involving a fiduciary relationship.
While acknowledging the general preponderance of the evidence standard for undue influence claims, the Court found that Iowa law does employ a heightened substantive standard for such claims. Specifically, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the result in a will contest clearly show the effects of undue influence. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the contested result was “clearly brought about” by undue influence, thereby meeting a heightened substantive standard.
The Court noted that while most states do not require this heightened substantive standard, both South Dakota and Nebraska had followed Iowa in this approach. The Court also explained the lack of uniformity in undue influence law across the 50 states.
The Court stated that it did not regard rejection of a clear and convincing standard of proof as inconsistent with the heightened substantive standard brought about by the word “clearly.” The heightened causation element made sense, the Court found, because it is not always easy to distinguish ordinary permissible influences on a testator from improper coercion. The Court noted that injection of the word "clearly" into the required elements added a measure of protection to the free will of a testator, filtering out claims that are unduly speculative, and preventing the doctrine from expanding beyond its limited scope. “By judicially establishing a somewhat higher causation standard, we increase the likelihood that specious undue influence claims are weeded out,” the Court concluded.
Conclusion
This opinion attempts to shed light on what has been a difficult and inconsistent area of law. It also underscores the dangers inherent in undue influence litigation. It remains to be seen, however, how a “heightened substantive” requirement buried within a preponderance of the evidence standard will play out in practice. It is not clear how the application of this standard will differ in reality from the application of an overall clear and convincing standard. What is clear is that—clarified standard or not—courts will likely continue to struggle with undue influence claims.
Burkhalter v. Burkhalter, No. 12-0222, 2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 132 (Iowa Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2013)