Family Battle Involves Issues of Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence

July 5, 2010 | Erin Herbold

This case involves issues of a mother’s competence to make a will and convey property by deed. Here, one of the sons (the executor of his mother’s will) appealed the trial court’s ruling that set aside his mother’s 2004 will in which she conveyed the homestead residence to him.  

Under the facts of this case, the mother signed a power of attorney in 2003, naming the son as attorney-in-fact. When the son took over the bank accounts, he discovered a will executed by his mother in 1984 leaving the entire estate to his brother. The son was the primary caretaker of his mother and, in 2004, the mother signed a new will, leaving her entire estate to her caretaker son. In 2005, she signed a quitclaim deed transferring her home to the same son. Mom died in 2007 and her 2004 will was admitted to probate. A daughter objected, claiming that her mother did not have the capacity to make the 2004 will or transfer the home by quitclaim deed in 2005. The daughter further claimed that her mother was unduly influenced by her brother in these transactions. 

The trial court found that the mother lacked the capacity to execute the documents and was the victim of undue influence by her son. The son appealed and the court stated that, “Mental capacity and freedom from undue influence are presumed.” Thus, it is difficult to prove undue influence and lack of mental capacity for the person claiming mental incapacity and undue influence.  That standard can be easier to meet, however, if there a confidential relationship exists between the testator and the person accused of undue influence.

The appellate court first addressed the issue of the mother’s mental capacity in the execution of the 2004 will. In general, in order for a decedent to have mental capacity to make a will, they must know and understand 1) the nature of the instrument they are executing, 2) the nature and extent of their property, 3) the natural objects of their bounty, and 4) the distribution that they wish to make. All four elements must exist “coextensively” at the time the will is executed.  In this case, a doctor testified that the mother had suffered such a severe type of stroke that she was unable to express herself through speaking or writing and had extreme difficulty in understanding matters.  Despite the contrary testimony of the son’s medical expert, the appellate court was convinced that the mother lacked mental capacity. Even those present at the will signing testified that the mother did not speak or make sounds and was not asked any questions required by the Iowa Code at will signing. 

The court next addressed the issue of capacity with respect to the mother’s conveyance of the homestead property by quitclaim deed in 2005. Again, the court determined that the overwhelming amount of evidence suggested that the stroke damaged the lobes in the left side of the brain to the point that she was substantially impaired. Thus, the court found that the mother lacked the capacity to transfer the homestead and her actions were the product of the undue influence of her son. Algoe v. Johnson, No. 0-360/09-1678 (Iowa Ct. App., Jun. 30, 2010).