Gleason v. Korde, No. 12-2025, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 892 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2014)
In a case the court compared to the novel Bleak House because of the parties’ protracted underlying litigation history, the Iowa Court of Appeals determined that a will provision attempting to prevent beneficiaries from partitioning devised property was unenforceable.
The testator, who owned farmland and a homestead, specified in her will that she left her property to her children “equally and in fee simple, subject to the following restrictions.” The restrictions detailed in a later article of her will stated that if any beneficiary should attempt to partition the real estate, then that “beneficiary’s share shall be forfeited and distributed to the other named beneficiaries.”
After the estate closed, two sons sought partition and sale of the property, but one son resisted, arguing that the two sons—by requesting partition—had, in accordance with the restriction in the will, forfeited their shares of the estate. The district court granted the request for partition, and the resisting son appealed.
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that a testator cannot make an absolute devise of property in fee and then, through a subsequent clause, defeat or limit that gift or limit the enjoyment of the gift. The court found that the testator’s attempt to prevent a partition failed because she had given the property to her children in fee simple. The no-partition clause in the testator’s will did not meet the criteria for the rare exception to the general rule that a testator may prohibit partition for a reasonable period of time. The testator in the case at hand did not list any time frame after which partition would be allowed. As such, the court ruled that the testator’s attempt to limit her children’s right to partition the property failed. The partition restriction language merely expressed the testator’s wishes and desires and had no legal significance.
The court decided this case on the merits in an attempt to bring the matter to a “satisfactory conclusion,” even though it first ruled that the appealing son lacked standing to pursue his claim. During the pendency of the appeal the son had transferred his interest in the property at issue to his sister by warranty deed. Even though she later transferred it back to him, the court ruled that he lost standing at the time of transfer because he then no longer had a personal and legal interest in the litigation. Once standing is lost, it cannot be regained.
As noted above, barring a partition of property by heirs can be set forth in a will provision if the prohibition is for a reasonable time. Such a provision will also be upheld if it is tied to the occurrence of a designated event. But, a will provision that restricts the right to partition cannot affect an heir that claims under a statute allowing the renunciation of the will, if the heir is taking an intestate share of the estate. The bar against partitioning property also cannot impact any heir’s homestead rights. But, any unreasonable restraint on the use and enjoyment of property is deemed to be against public policy. That’s why any prohibition on partition must be reasonable. On this issue, just like other will construction issues, courts generally try to ascertain the testator’s intent. Many courts, when faced with the issue in this case, will imply a reasonable term in order to carry out the decedent’s intent. In this case, the court essentially disregarded the testator’s intent and drew a hard line. Thus, in Iowa, a will provision restricting the right of partition must specifically state a “reasonable” time.