Criminal Indictment Upheld Against Farm Animal Terrorists.

The defendants, from the Bel Air, California, area, were arrested in Illinois and charged in a two count indictment with violating the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 43) (Act) for terroristic acts committed upon an Illinois mink farm.  In an earlier action, one of the charges involved using a facility of interstate and foreign commerce for the purpose of damaging and interfering with the operation of an animal enterprise under the Act.  Two cells phones were found in their car at the time of the arrest and the government searched those phones pursuant to a search warrant.  The search indicated contact with a third cell phone and the government sought an order seeking historical cell site and toll record information for the third phone.  The defendants claimed that the government had to obtain a search warrant to obtain that information because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.  The court disagreed with the defendants, noting that no federal case had ever determined that obtaining such information implicated the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a search warrant.  The court held that the defendants did not have an expectation of privacy in historical cell site information.  The court also noted that the records were relevant and material to the ongoing criminal investigation of the defendants and that the third cell phone's number belonged to one of the defendants.  United States v. Lang, et al., No. 14 CR 390, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7553 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2015).  In the present action, the indictment charged the defendants with damaging an animal enterprise (18 U.S.C. Sec. 43(a)(2)(A)) and conspiring to damage an animal enterprise (18 U.S.C. Sec. 43(a)(2)(C)).  The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the Act is facially overbroad because it criminalizes protected speech that causes an "animal enterprise" to lose profits or business goodwill.  They also challenged the indictment as being void for vagueness because it allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement against animal rights activists, and that it is violated substantive due process for punishing as terrorism non-violent damage to property.  The court rejected the overbreadth argument because the Act excludes purely economic damage.  The court also rejected the void for vagueness argument and the substantive due process argument under rational basis review.  United States v. Johnson, et al., No. 14-CR-390, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26843 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2015).  

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