Case Summaries

Plaintiffs, a retired farm couple and their daughter, were Minnesota residents looking for land investments. Plaintiffs knew the first defendant, a South Dakota resident, because the husband had attended farm auctions where the first defendant was the auctioneer, and the husband had participated in a number of consignment sales with him. The second defendant was the auctioneer’s son. Without seeking professional assistance, the plaintiffs entered into several major land transactions with the defendants. The couple purchased from the first defendant a 1,040-acre tract that was supposed to be planted with corn by the defendant and his son. They also purchased from the first defendant a 160-acre tract in South Dakota and 50 percent of a 480-acre tract (CRP ground) for their daughter. The latter tract was jointly owned by the daughter and the second defendant. After plaintiffs discovered that the 1,040 acre tract was 1,000 acres of weeds and that the 160-acre tract was not even owned by the defendant, the plaintiffs filed an action against defendants for breach of contract, deceit, and rescission. Pursuant to a default judgment, the court found the second defendant liable to the daughter for CRP payments, real estate taxes, and shared expenses. The court also entered judgment against the first defendant (and his wife), finding that the first defendant committed actual fraud in connection with the sale of the 160-acre tract. The plaintiffs were awarded $20,000 in punitive damages, in addition to their $337,974.51 in compensatory damages. The court determined that the first defendant’s conduct was reprehensible, shocking and evidenced a manipulative mind bent on taking advantage of others who trusted him. Although the plaintiffs were not entitled to rescind their contract for the 1,040-acre tract, they were awarded $149,286.69 in compensatory damages. Greeley v. Walters, No. 105003JLV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42627 (D. S.D. Mar. 30, 2014).


The plaintiff owned and operated a horse farm, where she taught riding lessons and boarded horses. When she decided to leave the country, she entered into a contract to sell the property to defendants, who purchased the property under a land contract. Plaintiff agreed to enter into the contract on the condition that the mother of one of the defendants would sign a personal guarantee. After two years of making monthly payments, the defendants were unable to obtain the financing necessary to make the final balloon payment due under the contract. The property value had dropped, and the defendants abandoned the property. Plaintiff sought to mitigate her damages by selling the property to a neighbor at a reduced price (only after providing notice to the defendants). The trial court granted a directed verdict in the amount of $178,093.89 for the plaintiff in her breach of contract action against defendants. On appeal, the court affirmed. Plaintiff was entitled to seek contract damages and mitigate those damages by selling the property. She did not, through the sale of the property, exercise the different remedy of foreclosure. There was consideration for the mother’s personal guarantee because the plaintiff agreed to enter into the contract only because of that guarantee.  Knox v. Briskin, No. 315003, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 465 (Mich. Ct. App.  Mar. 18, 2014).    


(an irrigation district mowed the canal banks of plaintiff’s property because it held an easement along the  banks; because of obstructions near the canal, the large commercial mower entered plaintiff’s property to turn and navigate; plaintiff filed an action against the district, alleging that negligence in mowing had caused damage to his plants, sprinklers, outbuildings, and a well; the district filed a counterclaim alleging that it held an easement and seeking the removal of all physical encroachments on the easement; the district court granted partial summary judgment for the district, dismissing plaintiff’s claim for damages to property within the 16-foot easement, but denying judgment on the claim for damages to property outside of the easement; at trial, the district court found that the district was not liable for any damage to plaintiff’s property outside of the easement because it did not breach its duty of care to plaintiff; the district court found that plaintiff’s outbuildings, sprinklers, and garden unreasonably interfered with the district’s ability to occupy the canal banks with its equipment and ordered that they be removed; on appeal, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiff did not establish that the district caused the damage to his property; the district court also properly ordered plaintiff to remove his encroachments; plaintiff could not use his property in a manner that unreasonably burdened the district’s enjoyment of the easement; the court remanded for a determination of the precise location of the easement).    


(appellees filed an action against appellant, seeking an injunction enjoining him from interfering with their easement on his road; the trial court granted relief to the appellees, and, on appeal, the court affirmed; the court found that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the easement had not been abandoned by appellees for nonuse; because appellant did not raise the seven-year statute of limitations in the lower court, he could not raise the issue on appeal; the trial court did not err in allowing appellees to construct a wider gate across the roadway because appellant’s narrow gate was interfering with the appellees’ farming use of the roadway; finally, the court found that the deed granting the easement "to have and to hold the same unto said GRANTEES and their heirs and assigns forever" granted an appurtenant easement, not one personal to the grantee).


(plaintiff alleged that he purchased working interests in several mining partnerships from the original owner of the leaseholds; for about 40 years, he received a proportionate share of the proceeds of the operations; the payments stopped when defendant purchased the majority interest in the partnerships; the wells then began to operate at a net annual loss, and defendant would bill plaintiff for his share of deficiencies, which he refused to pay; plaintiff filed this action against defendant seeking an accounting and compensatory and punitive damages; defendant sought summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff could produce no written instrument conveying him ownership of the working interests;  plaintiff responded that he possessed "an ownership interest in a partnership," not a real property interest and that such an interest could be proven by parol evidence and course of conduct; the district court entered judgment in favor of defendant, but on appeal the Fourth Circuit certified the following question to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals:  "Can the proponent of a working interest in a mineral lease prove his entitlement thereto without resort to proof that the lease interest has been conveyed to him in strict conformance with the Statute of Frauds").


 The plaintiffs owned a gravel road that served as an ingress/egress easement to their property that passed through the defendant's farm.  They claimed that the defendants had destroyed the road by driving heavy farm equipment across the road and allowing cattle to walk on it.  The defendants claimed that they had not violated any "generally accepted agricultural practices" or any statute or regulation with respect to the operation of their farm.  The trial court agreed with the defendants, determined that the state (TN) right-to-farm act barred the claims, and dismissed the case.  On appeal, the court held that the right-to-farm act only pertained to nuisance-type actions and did not apply claims involving unreasonable interference with the use of an ingress/egress easement which the plaintiffs had alleged.  The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs' had not stated a viable nuisance claim, but did make a viable claim for unreasonable interference with an access easement.  The plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently identified the elements of a claim of unreasonable interference with the use of an easement:  (1) it's existence; (2) unreasonable interference; and (3) actual damages.  The appellate court remanded the case.  Curtis v. Parchman, No. M2013-01489-COA-R3-CV, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 112 (Feb. 27, 2014).    


(decedent owned mineral interests which were distributed equally to two brothers with one brother's share reduced to one-fourth after brother's ex-wife received 50 percent of his 50 percent share; the brother owning a one-fourth mineral interest failed to file federal income tax returns for 1997 and 1999-2005 and IRS filed notices of federal tax liens (NFTLs) in the spring of 2005 for tax years 1997-2002 and another NFTL for the same years in September of 2006; on Oct. 6, 2006, the brother with the 1/4 mineral interest transferred his mineral interest to a trust; IRS moved to foreclose its liens; court determined that IRS had priority over royalties from brother's mineral interest with respect to those royalties for which the IRS liens were perfected before the brother's transfer of his mineral interest to the trust; with respect to the IRS lien filed in 2008, lien did not attach to brother's mineral interest because it had been transferred to the trust and lien only attached to brother's 45 percent interest in the trust, but not the trust's share of mineral interest royalties; IRS did not allege that transfer to trust was a fraudulent transfer)


(appellee filed an action against appellant, seeking a declaration that a public road had been established over appellant’s property; after a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of appellee, finding that the road, which had been dedicated to the public in 1932, had not been abandoned; in affirming the trial court’s judgment, the court ruled that appellant could not collaterally attack the commissioner court’s establishment of a road in 1932; the court also found that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the road crossing appellant’s property was part of the public road established in 1932; finally, the court found that the jury’s finding that the road had not been abandoned was not against the great weight of the evidence; the gates across the road had not been continuously locked or closed).


(plaintiffs and defendants were neighboring landowners; their predecessors in interest had purchased their respective properties from a common owner; defendants had recorded the deed to their property in 1941, and plaintiffs had recorded the deed to their adjacent property in 1953; plaintiffs’ deed failed to except a 10-acre tract of land specifically described in the defendants’ deed; in 2011, the plaintiffs filed a quiet title action, claiming ownership to the 10-acre tract; in affirming the lower court’s judgment in favor of the defendants, the court ruled that neither the plaintiffs’ deed nor the testimony of their surveyor had established the property line between the two properties; as such, the plaintiffs did not have “record title” to the property; the plaintiffs’ deed failed to mention the disputed tract, whereas the defendants’ deed specifically established the boundaries; plaintiffs failed to establish a claim by adverse possession because their possession of the land (to cut timber) was not open and notorious and was not hostile and under a claim of right).


(plaintiffs filed an action in state court against defendant, a railroad company, seeking a prescriptive easement for a roadway the plaintiffs used to access their property; the roadway crossed the railroad company’s property; the railroad company sought to remove the action to federal court, but the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for remand; the railroad company failed to establish an amount of controversy exceeding $75,000 so as to establish diversity jurisdiction; the railroad company failed to establish that the value of the property at issue was more than $75,000 or that its cost of compliance with any resulting injunction would be greater than $75,000; the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees).


(plaintiff brought a putative class action on behalf of similarly situated Minnesota counties seeking a declaratory judgment that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had violated state law by failing to pay transfer tax on transfers of deeds to real property; the County sought recovery for unjust enrichment and injunctive relief; the district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the County appealed, and the appellate court affirmed; the court ruled that the federal agencies’ charters stated that the agencies  "shall be exempt from all taxation . . . imposed by any State," and identified their real property as the sole exception to the general rule; the agencies were governmental instrumentalities which Congress had the authority to protect by exempting them from taxation imposed by the states; because the federal entities were not obliged to pay the tax, no unjust enrichment claim was stated).


(twenty-nine beachfront property owners filed an action against a town and others, seeking to quiet title to their beachfront properties up to the mean low-water mark, subject only to the public rights of usage in the intertidal property; the trial court determined that the town, the backlot owners (who had intervened), and the public enjoyed a public prescriptive easement as well as an easement by custom to engage in general recreational activities on both the wet and dry sand portions of the entire beach; the trial court also found that the State of Maine (which had intervened) had established, pursuant to the public trust doctrine, that the public's right to fish, fowl, and navigate included the right to cross the intertidal zone of the Beach to engage in all "ocean-based" activities; on appeal, the court vacated the order, ruling first that the backlot owners were not proper parties to the lawsuit because they had no interest in the property beyond that of general members of the public; the town had failed, as a matter of law, to rebut the presumption of permission in favor of the property owners that would negate a finding of adversity necessary to establish a prescriptive public easement; noting that it had never recognized an easement by custom as a viable cause of action in Maine, the court also vacated the lower court’s granting of the easement by custom; finally, the court found that the trial court’s determination that the public had a right to engage in ocean-based activities under the public trust doctrine was premature).


(plaintiffs and defendants owned property separated by a vacated residential road that had been dedicated to the county by the parties’ common predecessor in interest; many years later, the dedication was vacated by the county, and defendants sought to sell their property, including the entire width of the vacated road; plaintiffs filed a quiet title action in response, arguing that they were the owners of their side of the road, up to the centerline; the trial court granted judgment for defendants, finding that because the parties’ predecessor had included only defendants’ portion of his property in the residential subdivision he created, he evinced an intent to grant the entire portion of the dedicated road for the use of the subdivision; in reversing the trial court’s judgment, the court found that ORS 93.310(4) established a strong presumption that each adjoining landowner held title to its half of the road, up to the center line; defendants presented no evidence of the grantor’s intent sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption; as such, plaintiffs were entitled to relief in their quiet title action).


(plaintiff’s predecessor in interest entered into an agreement for a right of first refusal (ROFR) to purchase or lease defendants’ property; the ROFR was binding upon the parties, their heirs, representatives, successors in interest, and assigns, and plaintiff’s predecessor paid $4,000 for this right; thirteen years later, defendant notified plaintiff that she was terminating the ROFR; the lower court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the ROFR was contrary to public policy because it did not contain a definite term of years or months; in reversing the judgment, the court ruled that the ROFR was sufficiently definite because it did not place a restraint on alienation; rather, it provided a “possible buyer who was constantly available”).


(farm purchasers sought to oust tenants who were farming the property under a three-year written lease; the purchasers filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer (FED) against the tenants and sought an order enjoining them from possession; the tenants denied the allegations and asserted that they were in lawful possession of the farm under the lease; nearly two months after filing the complaint, the purchasers delivered a notice of termination of tenancy to the tenants, listing instances in which the tenants had defaulted under the lease; the trial court issued an order preliminarily enjoining the tenants from possessing the farmland, pending the outcome of the trial; the tenants filed an interlocutory appeal, and the appellate court vacated the preliminary injunction; the court found that the FED action was prematurely filed and the tenants’ rights to due process were violated because the purchasers failed to serve the tenants with proper written notice of termination 10 days before filing their action; the cause was dismissed without prejudice).

 


(in 1979, appellants’ predecessor in interest sold two tracts of land to appellees’ predecessor in interest; the deed granted appellees’ predecessor an express easement for egress and ingress across the neighboring property still owned by the grantor; shortly after the conveyance, the grantor erected a fence on his property to keep in his goats and sheep; in 1993, the grantor conveyed the neighboring property to his children (appellants), and they erected a high fence on the property; appellees purchased their 800-acre tract in 2010, and a dispute arose over the continuing validity of the easement; the trial court found that the easement did not violate the statute of frauds because a person familiar with the area could locate the easement with reasonable certainty; on appeal, the court affirmed, also finding that appellants failed to prove adverse possession; the high fence was not a “designed enclosure,” but was built to prevent deer from leaving the property; there was no evidence that the appellants had established a hostile “claim of right” to the property).


(a widow lived on an 83-acre tract of land from 1960, when she married her husband, until the 1990s, when she moved a short distance away; her husband died intestate in 1970, and she believed she owned the property, but under state intestacy law she would only receive one-third of the property if she exercised her dower right, which she did not, and property ultimately passed entirely to great nephew; widow paid the property taxes, provided all maintenance on the property, and granted her great nephew permission to hunt the property; only when she attempted to sell the property in 2009 or 2010 did the widow realize that title to the property was in her husband’s name only; she filed an action seeking a declaration of the true owner, and the trial court found that the widow had acquired title through adverse possession; on appeal, the great nephew argued that the widow was occupying the property only by permission; in affirming the trial court’s judgment, the court ruled that the widow had not occupied the property permissively; it was not necessary that the widow know she did not have title to the property for her possession to be “adverse”; her possession was exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious for more than 20 years).


(a mother leased different tracts of farmland to her two sons;  after son one could not pay to farm his tract in 2010, the mother signed an agreement leasing that tract to son two from 2010 through 2015; In 2011, son one told his mother that he wanted to farm the land again, and the son and his mother re-signed their original lease, purportedly extending the lease from 2011 through 2013; son one gave his mother a check for $28,522, but the written lease did not list the consideration; when son two learned of the new lease between son one and his mother, he reminded his mother that he had a written lease for the same property through 2015; the mother returned son one’s check and agreed that son two should farm the land; son one filed a breach of contract action against his mother and brother, and the district court dismissed his claims; on appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding that son one’s contract was invalid under the statute of frauds , N.D.C.C. § 9-06-04 because it did not contain the essential term of express consideration; the court ruled that the parol evidence rule could not be used to supply a missing essential term; the court also found that son one was not entitled to equitable relief because son one did not demonstrate part performance that removed the contract from the statute of frauds).


(in a boundary dispute between neighboring landowners, appellees sought to quiet title to their farm as described in their deed; appellees sought summary judgment, based upon their deed and a survey establishing their ownership to the disputed property; appellants responded by arguing that their deed conflicted with that of appellees and that they had a survey to support their position; appellants failed to name the surveyor, present a copy of the survey to the court, or submit an affidavit in support of their position; finding that appellants had failed to produce “affirmative evidence” to oppose the motion, the district court granted summary judgment to appellees, awarding them costs and attorney fees; on appeal, the court reversed on the portion of the order granting attorney fees; absent statutory authority, attorney fees were not allowable as costs).


(a waterfront property owner farmed oysters on his residential property; he requested an opinion from the local zoning administrator as to whether his operation was permitted pursuant to county zoning ordinances;  the administrator informed him that he needed a special use permit to continue to operate his business, and the property owner appealed. The board of zoning appeals upheld the administrator’s decision, but the circuit court reversed, finding that the property owner’s oyster business was a permitted use under the county ordinances; on appeal, the supreme court reversed, finding that the property owner did need a special use permit to continue his business; the court ruled that the property owner’s oyster farm was not a “principal use” of his property—so as to entitle him to a permit exemption—because the “principal use” of his property was as his residence; the oyster business was also not a listed “accessory use” under the ordinance; thus, to be lawful, the oyster business had to be operated as a “home occupation,” which required a special use permit).


(plaintiffs alleged that the fence line between their property and defendants’ property was not the actual boundary line; plaintiffs filed a quiet title action asserting that they owned fifteen feet of property north of the fence; in support of their claim, plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from their attorney setting forth evidence of a survey conducted by a professional land surveyor; the district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ alleged boundary line lacked a proper foundation; in a motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of the surveyor himself; the trial court denied the motion, finding that the surveyor’s affidavit was not new evidence since it was known by the plaintiffs before  the court considering the matter and that the affidavit was not timely submitted under the trial court’s scheduling order; plaintiffs appealed only the trial court’s finding that the affidavit was not new evidence; in affirming the judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that it could not consider the plaintiffs’ challenge to the judgment because the judgment would nonetheless stand on the independent, unchallenged basis that the affidavit was untimely submitted). 


(in 2005, plaintiffs leased the mineral rights in their property to defendants’ predecessor; one defendant had obtained all of the approvals necessary to commence drilling and had engaged in actual on-site construction activity preparatory to drilling before the expiration of the primary lease terms; actual drilling, however, did not begin until six days after the expiration of the primary lease term; plaintiffs sought judgment declaring that the leases had been extinguished and monetary damages for the wrongful extraction of oil and gas; defendants alleged that the development activity that took place before the end of the primary terms, followed by the drilling and ultimate completion of the well, were sufficient to extend the leases under the “engaged in drilling or re-working operations” language in the habendum clause; relying on Anderson v. Hess Corp., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (D.N.D. 2010), aff'd, 649 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 2011), the court agreed; the material facts in the cases were materially indistinguishable; “drilling operations” was a more expansive term than “drilling”;  it encompassed the pre-drilling activities in which the defendant had engaged, thereby extending the leases).


(an owner of agricultural property, including hog buildings and a utility shed, challenged a decision from the Indiana Board of Tax Review, which upheld the county official’s assessment of his property at $274,500, rather than the $218,262 assessed amount he claimed; on review, the court affirmed, finding that the Board’s determination was based upon substantial evidence and consistent with  the law; it was not error to find that the taxpayer’s evidence under an allocation approach, a cost approach, an income approach, and a market data approach lacked probative value).


(plaintiff purchased his property in 1976; defendant purchased his adjoining property at a public auction in November of 2003; defendant recorded his deed on January 9, 2004, which contained an improper description stemming from a mistaken land survey; on January 5, 2011, plaintiff filed an action asserting that defendant’s tract encroached upon his property and that he was entitled to recover the profits attributable to the disputed three-acre tract; defendant asserted the defenses of laches and adverse possession; the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $2,628, finding that the disputed area was contained within plaintiff’s tract and that defendant had failed to prove adverse possession or tacking; on appeal, the court affirmed; defendant could not assert adverse possession under color of title because he filed his deed within the seven-year statutory period for adverse possession under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-102; the trial court’s credibility determinations regarding the finding that defendant did not exercise possession of the disputed property before  recording his deed were entitled to weight; defendant failed to prove gross laches because he was aware that the boundary line was disputed when he purchased the property).


(owners were not required to obtain a building permit to build a horse barn because it qualified as an “agricultural building,” entitled to an exemption under township’s uniform construction code; the planned horse born, including stables for horses and a riding ring to exercise the horses, was not open to the general public, but accessible only to invited guests; a building could be both an “agricultural building” and a “commercial building”; the court also found that horses, regardless of their use, constituted “livestock”). 


(a boundary dispute arose between owner one and owner two; the county moved its improperly located quarter-section monument, and the parties discovered that a boundary fence erected by owner two 19 years earlier was in the wrong location; owner one sought a declaration of interest in real property, and owner two alleged titled by adverse possession and acquiescence; the court ruled that owner two did not prove adverse possession because he had not shown the required 20-year possession; owner two could not “tack” his time of possession to that of the prior owner because owner one and owner two acquired their property from a common grantor; title by acquiescence did not apply because the fence was not erected to solve a boundary dispute, and owner two did not rely upon a survey in erecting the fence).  


(plaintiffs purchased a landlocked parcel, assuming they could use a private road owned by defendants for access, even though one of the defendant’s representatives had warned them before the purchase that they would need to secure an easement for ingress and egress; plaintiffs filed their action alleging that they were entitled to an equitable easement by necessity; trial court found that plaintiffs had “rolled the dice” by purchasing property without securing access to that property and denied the easement based on hardship to defendants, who wanted to develop the property;  on appeal, the court affirmed the denial of the easement; plaintiffs were not innocent; they knew they did not have legal access to the property, bought it anyway, and attempted to “extort their neighbors; trial court did not abuse discretion in denying them an equitable easement).


(trial court determined that boundary line between parties properties was established by 2004 survey; plaintiffs claim that boundary established by acquiescence or adverse possession; prima facie evidence showed that boundary established by acquiescence and is consistent with amount of property defendants purchased in 1972; trial court decision reversed). 


(plaintiffs filed a quiet title action, seeking to establish that the true boundary line separating the parties’ properties was a survey line, not a dilapidated fence; the court upheld a trial court’s finding that defendants proved their ownership of the disputed parcel under a theory of “acquiescence,” pursuant to Iowa Code § 650.14; the evidence showed that there had been “mutual recognition” by two adjoining landowners for 10 years or more that a line, definitely marked by a fence, was the dividing line between them; defendants had farmed and tended to the disputed strip for at least 20 years, and plaintiffs’ predecessors never disputed the use or asserted their ownership interests in the property).


(property owners obtained favorable tax treatment after being granted a “current use assessment” on 448.5 acres and entered into a 10-year “conservation use assessment of agricultural property covenant agreement” pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.4; the board of assessors asserted that the owners violated their covenant by operating a commercial grain business on a portion of the property; in reversing the lower court’s ruling in favor of the owners and remanding for further consideration, the court found that the lower court may have erroneously based its decision on the faulty premise that operating a business on the property would never breach the covenant; the correct rule was that if a taxpayer was operating some other type of business, and the business was not “incidental, occasional, intermediate, or temporary,”  but was “detrimental to or in conflict with the property’s primary purpose,” the land would not qualify for a current use assessment). 


(tenant and landlord executed an agreement on May 3, 2010, for the lease of a farm from January 1, 2010 through December 31, 2012; lease provided that $51,100 annual rent was due “April 1 of each year of the lease”; when tenant failed to pay any rent during 2010, the landlord filed suit, and the trial court entered judgment in landlord’s favor; in affirming the judgment, the court ruled that the trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence showing the intent of the parties as to when rent was due; the court found that although the due date was ambiguous, the rent was due either May 3, 2010, or December 31, 2010; under either interpretation, the tenant breached the contract; the court urged practitioners drafting leases that would be executed after the effective date of the lease to include a clause specifying that the initial payment was “due upon execution” or upon some specific date thereafter). 


(plaintiffs filed an action challenging a decision from the county road commission, which denied their request for a driveway permit to access their farmland from a stub street in a residential neighborhood; the trial court ordered the commission to grant the permit, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court had not given proper deference to the commission’s decision; plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Driveway Act, MCL 247.321 et seq. because the commission’s denial of the permit was not “totally unreasonable”; access was available from a sparsely populated street, which would allow unobstructed access for plaintiffs’ wide farm equipment; the Right to Farm Act, MCL  286.471 et seq. was not implicated by the commission’s actions because the RTFA did not address the permitting or location of field driveways; thus, the RTFA did not preempt the commission’s decision).


(plaintiffs sought rezoning of property from agricultural to commercial to allow operation of seasonal deer processing facility and retail counter; agreement reached restricting use of tract to wild game processing and associated activities  in addition to allowing a single family residence; defendant approved zoning request consistent with agreement; plaintiffs again sought rezoning to add service of ready to eat food; request denied; retail services could be conducted year-round, but plaintiffs could not serve ready-to-eat foods or have a deli shop; on appeal, court determined that ordinance limited plaintiffs’ retail services to seasonal operations between October and January; deli-style sandwiches not permitted; retail service does not comprise ready-to-eat products). 


(plaintiff owned 13 acres containing his residence, barns, lake and 11 acres of woods; property assessed at $192,600 and plaintiff challenged appeal on basis that 2009 assessment was more than 5 percent greater than 2008 assessment and because bulk of tract categorized as residential excess acreage rather than agricultural land that he used to grow trees for firewood (and neighbor’s similar tract classified as ag; assessor noted that plaintiff did not use his tract for ag purposes and that assessment correct because it was less than 2005 purchase price and 2008 list price; Indiana Board of Tax Review’s determination that plaintiff bore burden to establish invalidity of assessment incorrect, but Board’s determination supported by evidence).


(plaintiff’s zoning board denied defendant’s request for a special  land-use permit to construct a motocross  complex on a parcel of land; after plaintiff received complaints that defendant proceeded with its plan despite the denial, plaintiff sought an injunction preventing defendant from constructing and operating the complex; the trial court denied defendant’s claims that the zoning ordinance violated its due process and equal protection rights, but amended its preliminary injunction to allow defendant to construct one track on the property and to ride up to six machines on the track every second and fourth weekend of the month; in affirming, the court ruled that the trial court did not err in determining that defendant’s planned activities constituted a public nuisance and nuisance per se; the zoning board’s actions were rationally related to the legitimate purpose of protecting the public health, safety, and welfare of its residents, and defendant was not treated in a dissimilar manner from similarly-situated businesses; denial of the special use permit did not constitute a regulatory taking).


(trial court determined that defendants had acquired 28 acres via adverse possession; defendants were children who grew up on the property on land adjacent to the disputed tract and had made various uses of the property from 1926 to 1957; children had later inherited the adjacent property; uses of disputed tract included enclosing portions with fencing, keeping livestock, picking berries, picnicking, etc.; sufficient evidence present to support trial court’s determination).


(tract of farmland owned in tenancy in common and partition sought with no party asserting homestead defense or entitlement to homestead rights; motion for summary judgment filed; court appointed referee to sell property and tract sold for $519,110; defendant then claimed tract was his homestead and he should be entitled to 40 acres; trial court held that summary judgment was res judicata and approved sale; court noted that homestead defense is a defense that can be waived by not being plead; defendant did not raise homestead defense in answer to partition petition and consented to summary judgment in partition action;  defendant’s argument that trial court did not consider factors other than price in approving sale not raised at trial and cannot be raised on appeal; trial court decision affirmed).


(plaintiffs sold wetland easement on 283 acres to federal government for $1.23 million with plaintiffs remaining liable for property taxes on property; County Assessor assessed property at $410,480, but plaintiffs claim assessed value was only $75,000; defendant upheld assessment; on appeal, court affirmed; state law requires property to be valued at actual value for property tax purposes with ag property assessed based on productivity and net earning capacity as used for ag purposes; plaintiffs claim that tract has no value as ag land due to easement  because it has no productivity as ag land due to easement; court disagreed on basis that tract still had “net earning capacity” which encompassed potential productivity; plaintiffs failed to produce evidence to counter assessor’s testimony that value accounted for easement; comparable sales given weight by court). 


(landowners held a determinable fee mineral interest that would revert to them when oil and gas ceased to be produced from the land, and sought declaratory judgment that such provision terminated under 1985 provision in deed; court determined that deed conveying mineral interest incorporated pre-existing  oil and gas lease on the land that deemed payment of shut-in royalty to be constructive production; while no oil or gas production occurred at time of end of term of mineral deed, shut-in royalties continuously paid; court granted summary judgment to landowners because definition of production contained in lease incorporated into mineral deed; terms of mineral deed control).


(plaintiff owns farmland and defendant owns mineral rights on same tract by virtue of severance deed that granted surface estate to plaintiff while “reserving and excepting” mineral estate to grantor; plaintiff uses surface estate to graze sheep and hay production; defendant operates three natural gas wells (via permits from state which required plaintiff to be given notice) on ten acres that was formerly used for hay production and that acreage is no usable for any other purpose; defendant followed waste disposal method denoted on permits  to dispose of drill cuttings; plaintiff sued for common law trespass, nuisance, trespass, negligence, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and sought injunction and damages; trial court granted summary judgment for defendant and appellate court affirmed; creation of drill waste pits necessary for recovery of natural gas and did not substantially interfere with surface use of property and was consistent with mineral lease and is common practice).


(plaintiff owns over 4,000 acres and entered into oil and gas lease with company in 2004 that assigned lease to defendant; plaintiff sued to have lease nullified on basis that it did not anticipate use of fracking; plaintiff had earlier transferred some of subject property into conservation easements with state DNR to protect areas around creek and associated tributaries from development; lease agreement barred drilling near creek and associated streams and gave plaintiff right to approve drilling sites; plaintiff construed delay rental clause to require drilling to commence on or before May 5, 2011, but defendant disagreed with that interpretation; in early 2011, defendant notified plaintiff of plans to horizontal drill from another property that would go under plaintiff’s property and that drill site was larger than allowed in lease; plaintiff sought to nullify lease on basis that defendant had not paid in full for delayed drilling on balance of property and that plaintiff had not approved horizontal drill site and that fracking not anticipated in lease; court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether plaintiff unreasonably withheld or delayed approval for drill site which means reserves for trial issue of whether defendant properly extended lease beyond primary term; likewise, genuine issue of material fact exists as to parties’ understanding of meaning of “delay rental” as used in lease, so issue of whether defendant required to tender delay rental payments during secondary term to be resolved at trial). 


(partnership challenged a trial court’s judgment approving a commissioners’ report partitioning a 525.39 acre tract jointly owned by the partnership and a second owner; partnership argued that it was entitled to an implied easement along a roadway extending across the middle of the second owner’s property; in affirming the trial court’s judgment, appellate court ruled that partnership failed to establish three of the four requirements for an implied easement: (1) because a portion of the requested easement belonged to a third party, the partnership had not established the “unity of ownership” between the dominant and servient estates necessary for an implied easement; (2) the partnership did not establish “continuous use” of the easement such that the parties must have intended an easement to pass by implication; and (3) the partnership did not establish that an implied easement was a “reasonable necessity” because the commissioners granted the partnership two means to access its property, one that was specifically granted to provide access during flooding). 


(adverse possession case involving land between two adjacent farms; survey established boundary that resulted in smaller tract for plaintiff; plaintiff thus claimed title to land in dispute by adverse possession; both parties produced witnesses that testified about usage of tract in issue and jury returned verdict in favor of defendant, the legal title holder; plaintiff's sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and trial court granted motion; on appeal, court reversed on basis that reasonable minds could have disagreed and jury verdict should have been upheld).


(Arkansas landowners seek summary judgment against defendant for defendant’s failure to pay cash bonuses of $300 per acre in addition to royalty payments in accordance with oil and gas leases; landowners executed leases and defendant failed to pay on bank drafts because it had made determination to abandon oil and gas exploration in the county after drilling dry well; trial court granted summary judgment on finding that lease agreements were binding and only subject to defendant’s good faith approval of title and cancellation unrelated to title; appellate court affirmed; language of written oil and gas leases coupled with bank draft issued to pay cash bonus constituted enforceable contracts; mutuality of obligation present even though bank draft contained “no-liability” clause because such clause contrary to language in lease; lease agreements were accepted in accordance with approval language and renunciation of lease does not preclude enforceability). 


(parties own adjacent tracts with defendants acquiring their tract first; defendants used property for training and riding horses; electric fence constructed on plaintiffs’ property along with paddock; ownership of strip in dispute; defendant’s use not continuous or with intent to claim ownership; electric fence not boundary fence). 


(consolidated appeals concerning issues related to the same tract of land; appeal found substantial evidence supported jury verdict finding defendant entitled to an easement by necessity for running a water line across the plaintiff’s property because the defendant’s property was land-locked and an earlier lawsuit mandated that the water company extend service to the defendant; appeal upheld zoning board decision denying application for commercial activity on plaintiff’s property not arbitrary as evidence demonstrated intended activity exceeded that stated in application, increased traffic to occur, and other adverse effects on neighboring property).


(boundary dispute based on 1974 deed’s reference to an “existing fence”; question was whether current “zigzag” fence or former “straight” fence that no longer existed was referenced; property was split in 1974 and the deed referenced the property line as the fence; in 1977 the landowner purchased the second half of the property and the deed reference the boundary as a straight line; subsequent conveyances of the properties continued to carry this discrepancy; plaintiff also pled adverse possession claim for the use of the disputed area; trial court found evidence showed boundary in 1974 was straight line; adverse possession also was not proven because plaintiff could not establish continuous use of the area for 10 years; decision affirmed on appeal).


(property tax assessment dispute between county assessor and landowners regarding proper valuation of 3.3 acres of land used for hay cultivation; all parties agreed property was properly classified as agricultural, but disagreed as to why; assessor argued valuation should be made pursuant to statutory requirements for vacant and unused property classified as agricultural which examined best use of property and assesses property based on fair market value ($374,500 assessment); landowners claimed use of property was agricultural and valuation should be based on land’s productive capability ($400 assessment); hearing officer determined land was used for agricultural purposes and valuation should be based on productive capability, which she valued at $75 an acre; assessor appealed and district court reversed, holding property should be assessed at fair market value; landowners appealed; appellate court held that determination of use was question of fact for hearing officer and her decision upheld because not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; court also held that agricultural purpose under statute does require use to be profitable or meet other “objective” criteria proffered by assessor).


(easement holder’s predecessor-in-title executed quitclaim deed favoring servient landowner’s predecessor-in-title that released interest in land, but QCD did not extinguish easement; no clear intent to abandon; in addition, evidence supported finding that easement use consistent with original purpose of easement; nominal damages awarded).


(boundary dispute between adjacent properties; plaintiffs claimed fence line in existence since 1947 established boundary by agreement; in granting summary judgment to defendants, district court disagreed because fence erected while parcels were under common ownership to separate cattle from farmed fields, so there was no agreement at the time built that fence established boundary; appellate court reversed and remanded for lower court to consider actions and acquiescence of subsequent landowners in 60 years since fence built to determine if agreement existed, including predecessor’s practice of farming to fence line and well-established wind break planted on other side of fence line).


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