Assaderaghi v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2014-33 (petitioner engaged in over 500 trades annually, incurred losses and claimed ordinary loss status; court determined that $2.6 million of gross proceeds did not amount to substantial trading activity and that executing those trades on 154 days during year at issue (with 50 percent of trades occurring in three month period) not frequent activity; record failed to establish that petitioner held trades for short periods of time; petitioner actually traded on margin involving security sales, call and put options and short sales; 40 percent of trades were day trades; petitioner had substantial income from full-time day job in engineering field; court determined that petitioner not a trader and losses were capital in nature).
Smith v. Comr., T.C. Sum. Op. 2014-13 (petitioners, married couple, sustained rental real estate losses; losses subject to passive activity loss limitations; time log was "ballpark guesstimate" constructed after-the-fact and couldn't establish material participation; petitioners' income at high enough level such that $25,000 deduction amount phased-out).
Howerter v. Comr., T.C. Sum. Op. 2014 (innocent spouse case involving equitable relief under I.R.C. Sec. 6015(f); couple married in 1992 and divorced in 2010; wife prepared couple's returns and couple failed to report over $9,000 in husband's non-employee compensation reported on 1099-Misc.; former wife filed request for innocent spouse relief via Form 8857 for 2007 tax year and IRS proposed to grant relief to former wife; court determined that former wife had actual knowledge of former husband's non-employee compensation and failed to qualify for relief, but court considered whether former wife eligible for equitable relief under I.R.C. Sec. 6015(f) based on facts and circumstances; court determined that three factors of Rev. Proc. 2013-34 neutral (economic hardship; legal obligation to pay liability; physical or mental health) three factors weighed in favor of former wife (marital status; lack of significant benefit; compliance with tax laws after divorce) and one factor weighed against granting relief (knowledge or reason to know)).
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201407024 (Nov. 18, 2013) (issue was whether exempt organization (integrated health group operating hospitals and clinics) can conduct school activities along with exempt functions and still qualify as exempt organization under I.R.C. Sec. 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) and I.R.C. Sec. 514(c)(9)(c) such that debt-financed property rules inapplicable; IRS noted that to qualify as exempt under I.R.C. Sec. 170(b)(1)(A)(ii), organization's primary function must be school activities; primary function test not met where 13 percent of expenditures for instruction and 20 percent of employees involved with schooling and 6 percent of revenues derived from school activities).
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201409018 (Nov. 19, 2013) (taxpayer is an LLC treated for tax purposes as a partnership and is owned in-part by a disregarded entity for federal tax purposes; disregarded entity is wholly owned by LP and is partially owned by a management company that is a real estate investment trust (REIT) that is wholly owned by LP; LP is also affiliate of a trust - a publicly held statutory REIT; taxpayer is related to LP for purposes of I.R.C. Sec. 1031; taxpayer owned retail building and wants to enter into sale agreement with unrelated third party; taxpayer to then enter into exchange agreement with qualified intermediary to which rights of transaction will be assigned; replacement property; replacement property is vacant urban office building which is subleased by ground lessee that is a wholly owned by LP; building to be demolished then vacant land to be subleased to exchange accommodation party or sublease to exchange accommodation party which will then demolish building; sublease to have term of over 30 years and interests not to be disposed of within two years; transaction qualifies for like-kind exchange treatment).
McNealy v. Comr., T.C. Sum. Op. 2014-14 (petitioner's equalization payment to former spouse not deductible as alimony; payment constituted property settlement and petitioner required to make payment even if former spouse died; requirements of I.R.C. Sec. 71 not satisfied).
Discussion Draft of Proposed Tax Changes (Feb., 26, 2014) (House Ways and Means Committee Chair Camp (R-MI, released discussion draft of tax proposals; among provisions included in draft discussion document are single 25 percent corporate tax rate phased in over time; 15 percent research credit of qualified expenses exceeding 50 percent of average qualified research for prior three years; phase-out of the DPAD; MACRS rules repealed and replaced with depreciation lives matching useful life of particular asset; expense method depreciation set at $250,000; some advertising expenses would be subject to capitalization and amortization; cash method of accounting allowed for all businesses with annual gross receipts not exceeding $10 million).
EBC Asset Inv., Inc. v. Sullivan Auctioneers, LLC, No. 13-1378, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21724 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014) (farmers granted a security interest in their personal property, including their equipment, to a bank which financed the farmers’ operation; the FDIC shut down the bank, and the FDIC sold the associated notes and security interest to the plaintiff; the farmers then decided to go out of business and hired defendant, an auctioneer, to sell their assets; no one provided notice of the auction to the plaintiff, and the farmers’ assets were liquidated and distributed to another creditor, one of the farmers, and the defendant; plaintiff filed an action against defendant, alleging that its security interest was unlawfully converted; a magistrate judge denied defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the district court adopted that recommendation; the action was governed by a five-year statute of limitations, pursuant to 735 ILSC 5/13-205 because it was an action for the conversion of personal property (security interest in the form of equipment); the court rejected defendant’s argument that Article 9 of the UCC did not apply, ruling that Article 9 governed the rights of a party holding a security interest, even after that interest was created).
Mc Vicars v. Christensen, No. 38705, 2014 Ida. LEXIS 59 (Idaho Feb. 20, 2014), substituted opinion for McVicars v. Christensen, No. 38705, 2013 Ida. LEXIS 371 (Ida. Sup. Ct. Dec. 27, 2013) (the defendants built a fabric building adjacent to the plaintiffs' property for use as an indoor horse riding arena; plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants, alleging that the building was a public and private nuisance; the trial court ordered defendants to remove the building, finding that defendants’ course of conduct unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their property and constituted a private nuisance; on appeal, the court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings; the court found that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring defendants to remove the building; an adjoining landowner did not have a right under nuisance law to prohibit the erection of structures on adjoining property that he or she considered not to be aesthetically pleasing; the lawfully constructed building did not, based on its size or proximity, constitute a nuisance; on remand, the trial court was to consider the allegations of noise, dust, lights, and odors, and fashion any reasonable restrictions necessary to limit interference with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their property based upon those factors; the trial court properly found that the state (ID) Right to Farm Act did not apply because the case did not involve a change in the character of the surroundings).
Center for Food Safety v. Lakey, No. 03-13-00094-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1763 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2014)( (plaintiffs included a public interest food safety group and several individuals; plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) to enforce Tex. Health & Safety Code §821.003, which prescribed requirements for how caretakers were to treat “live birds,” including housing them in suitable cages and providing them with suitable food and clean water; plaintiffs alleged that Texas egg production facilities were violating this statute and that the Agency should step in and enforce the law; in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the action, the appellate court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the matter; section 821.003 was intended to prevent cruelty to animals, not health risks associated with food production; the Agency did not have a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to enforce the statute; rather, local law enforcement officers were tasked with enforcing §821.003; the legislature had granted the Agency extensive authority to address unsanitary conditions in egg production facilities through other means).
In re Woods, No. 12-1111, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2960 (10th Cir. Feb. 19, 2014), reversing, bankruptcy court opinion and B.A.P. opinion reported at 65 B.R. 196 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012) (Chapter 12 case; debtors (married couple) farmed hay and raised horses since 1999; debtors purchased land securing bank’s claim in 2007 and decided to build home on tract in 2008; home construction loan executed in 2008 and bank approved debtors for 30-year adjustable rate permanent loan; home completed in 2009 and parties engaged in dispute over bank’s commitment to permanent financing ultimately resulting in foreclosure of construction mortgage and pending sale of home which precipitated debtors’ Chapter 12 filing; debtors’ office and farm headquarters located in newly constructed home; issue was whether debtors qualified for Chapter 12; if bank’s principal and interest claim included in debtors’ farm debts, 50 percent test satisfied; court determined that construction portion of bank loan included in debtor’s “farm” debt because house was integral part of farm operation due to farm’s books and records maintained in office in home and home’s proximity to farming operation which allowed debtors to care for livestock and maintain irrigation system; debtors’ treatment of bank’s claim also satisfies 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(5) – U.S. Supreme Court decision in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), overrules In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990) and formula approach to determining cramdown interest rate applicable to Chapter 12 reorganization plan to be utilized rather than market rate for similar loan approach of Hardzog; interest rate is prime rate plus 2 percent; amended Chapter 12 plan feasible and confirmable; on further review by 10th Circuit, court reversed on issue of whether principal residence debt arises out of a farming operation; 10th Circuit held that debt "arises out of farming operation" under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(18)(A) if it is directly and substantially connected to any of the activities constituting a farming operation as defined by 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(21); when loan debt is involved, objective "direct use" test to be used in determining when "direct-and-substantial-connection standard is satisfied" - loan proceeds must be used directly for or in farming operation for debt to "arise out of" farming operation; bankruptcy court used incorrect standard and is reversed).
Northern Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, No. 12-2653, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2932 (7th Cir. Feb. 18, 2014) (a Wisconsin grain producer entered into a number of contracts under which he sold grain to an Illinois-based grain buyer; after a nine-year relationship, the buyer alleged that the producer repudiated several oral agreements, entitling the buyer to $ 1 million in damages; when the producer refused to arbitrate the dispute, the buyer filed an action in Illinois state court, seeking an order compelling the producer to arbitrate; the trial court dismissed the action on the grounds that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the producer; on appeal, the court affirmed; the producer, who lived, worked, and purchased all equipment in Wisconsin, lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Illinois such that the State could—consistent with the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—exercise personal jurisdiction over the producer; contracting with an out-of-state party could not alone establish sufficient minimum contacts; the buyer always traveled to Wisconsin to meet with the producer; indeed the producer had only set foot in Illinois once—to attend a seed corn meeting where he met the representative from the buyer, some nine years before the buyer filed its action; the producer did not purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting business in Illinois).
King, et al. v. Sebelius, No. 3:13-CV-630, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20019 (Feb. 18, 2014) (case involves I.R.C. Sec. 36B credit which is designed to offset some of increase in health insurance premium costs caused by Obamacare; I.R.C. Sec. 36B(b)(2)(A) defines the "premium assistance amount" by referring to "the monthly premiums for...qualified health plans offered in the individual market...which were enrolled in through an Exchange established by the state under 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act..."; implementing regulation states that credit is available to enrollees in federally-facilitated Exchanges rather than just state Exchanges; plaintiffs were not eligible for government or employer-sponsored health insurance coverage and without the credit health insurance would not have been affordable to them and, hence, no penalty would apply for failing to obey the government dictate to buy health insurance; plaintiffs lived in state that had a federally-facilitated Exchange, thus the regulation now results in plaintiffs being penalized for failing to obey the government command to buy health insurance; court determined that plaintiffs case did not involve tax refund action (i.e., plaintiffs needed to buy insurance and waive their claims or don't buy insurance, get penalized and then file refund suit and recover only upon prevailing); court upheld regulation under Chevron (467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984)) deference standard).
Black v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2014-27 (petitioner borrowed against his life insurance policy and did not repay loans; upon termination of policy, loans satisfied by policy proceeds; petitioner didn't report income associated with satisfaction of the loans; IRS asserted that petitioner realized income to extent of policy loan principal and capitalized interest on policy loan; court upheld IRS determination; accuracy-related penalty imposed).
Close v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2014-25 (IRS claimed that petitioners' trusts for benefit of their children were shams; IRS failed to carry burden of proof; IRS bore burden of proof due to sham trust theory not being consistent with statutory notice of deficiency provided to petitioners; IRS failed to establish some of the factors required by Markosian v. Comr., 73 T.C. 1235 (1980)).
Clark v. Van Meter, No. 2012-CA-000169-MR, 2014 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 116 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2014) (plaintiffs and defendants were neighboring landowners; their predecessors in interest had purchased their respective properties from a common owner; defendants had recorded the deed to their property in 1941, and plaintiffs had recorded the deed to their adjacent property in 1953; plaintiffs’ deed failed to except a 10-acre tract of land specifically described in the defendants’ deed; in 2011, the plaintiffs filed a quiet title action, claiming ownership to the 10-acre tract; in affirming the lower court’s judgment in favor of the defendants, the court ruled that neither the plaintiffs’ deed nor the testimony of their surveyor had established the property line between the two properties; as such, the plaintiffs did not have “record title” to the property; the plaintiffs’ deed failed to mention the disputed tract, whereas the defendants’ deed specifically established the boundaries; plaintiffs failed to establish a claim by adverse possession because their possession of the land (to cut timber) was not open and notorious and was not hostile and under a claim of right).
In re Estate of Araguz III, No. 13-11-00490-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 1573 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2014) (decedent was firefighter who died in line of duty and trial court determined that decedent's surviving "spouse" was not legal beneficiary of decedent's estate because "spouse" was born a male and, therefore, was not legally married to decedent under state law at time of decedent's death; surviving "spouse" had male genitalia and was diagnosed at age 18 with "gender dysphoria" and placed on feminizing hormone therapy and continued living as a female; surviving "spouse" change name to female name at age 21 and was issued amended birth certificate and obtained KS driver's license which was used to obtain TX driver's license which was then used to obtain TX marriage license at age 33; after wedding, surviving "spouse" underwent "genital reassignment" surgery which reassembled male genitalia into female; two years later, decedent died; decedent's mother and ex-wife sued seeking declaration that marriage was void; trial court granted summary judgment for mother and ex-wife; on appeal, court reversed on basis that genuine issue of material fact remained regarding surviving "spouse's" gender which requires expert testimony to resolve).
Anderson v. Zimbelman, No. 201302072014, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 25 (N.D. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 2014) (plaintiff was the assignee of a bank which had loaned money to debtors in exchange for receiving three mortgages; defendants were judgment creditors of the debtors; the judgment creditors had executed on their $727,495 judgment, and the sheriff held a sale at which the bank bid $495,000 and received a certificate of sale for the property; the bank did not pay $495,000 to the sheriff, and the sheriff returned the execution unsatisfied; the bank paid $5,097.50 in commission and fees for the sale; the bank and judgment creditors later signed an agreement under which they agreed that the bank would not seek fees from the judgment creditors, that the judgment creditors’ debt was subordinated to the banks’ mortgages, and that the bank’s foreclosure of its mortgages would extinguish the judgment creditors’ judgment lien; when the bank’s assignee filed its foreclosure action, the judgment creditors argued that they were entitled to a $210,977.93 surplus from the sheriff's sale on the grounds of conversion, fraud, and specific performance; in affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the assignee, the court ruled that the judgment creditors failed to prove fraud or constructive fraud; the agreement clearly spelled out that the judgment creditors’ lien would be subordinated to the bank’s mortgages, and the bank’s agreement to forbear collecting a portion of the fees from the judgment creditors constituted sufficient consideration).
Shea Homes, Inc and Subsidiaries, et al. v. Comr., 142 T.C. No. 3 (2014) (plaintiff, a builder, allowed to defer payment of tax on home sales until point in time at which sales of homes in huge development project reached 95 percent in the aggregate; IRS claimed that tax obligation triggered when each individual home sold; in so holding, court affirmed plaintiff's use of completed-contract method of accounting; similar case on same issue remains pending with Tax Court).
In re White, No. BK12-42639, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 578 (Bankr. D. Neb. Feb. 12, 2014) (Chapter 7 case in which debtor disclaimed his interest in his deceased father's estate five months before filing bankruptcy; court determined that such disclaimer was a "transfer" as defined by 11 U.S.C. Sec. 727(a)(2)(A), but that trial needed to determine whether debtor filed disclaimer with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors).
Green v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2014-23 (petitioner, a waitress, received payments in settlement of civil rights claims against employer and excluded them from income as received on account of physical injury or sickness; IRS claimed payments not excludible under I.R.C. Sec. 104(a)(2) because they were labeled as wages and emotional distress rather than as being related to any physical injury or sickness; also, settlement did not indicate that petitioner incurred any non reimbursed medical expenses).
Vitarbo v. Comr., T.C. Sum. Op. 2014-11 (petitioner, neurosurgeon, entered into agreement with medical center designed to induce petitioner to establish practice in return for payment of student loans; for year in issue, petitioner earned income from third party educational institution and incurred certain expenses that petitioner deducted on Schedule C; court agreed with IRS that petitioner incurred expenses as employee and, as such, expenses deductible as miscellaneous itemized deductions on Schedule A to extent in excess of 2 percent of petitioner's AGI)
Hall v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2014-16 (IRS claimed that petitioner had unreported business income and sought petitioner's books and records pertaining to business records; petitioner couldn't provide sufficient documentation and IRS sought deposit records to prepare bank deposits to reconstruct petitioner's income; IRS then reduced total deposits by reported income; court determined that IRS introduced enough evidence to establish extent of petitioner's unreported income to satisfy burden of production; petitioner claimed that unreported amounts were nontaxable advances, but petitioner failed to document that claim).
Ball, et al. v. Comr., No. 13-2247, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2594 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 2014), aff'g., T.C. Memo. 2013-39 (plaintiff family formed trusts that came to own stock in S corporation that owned C corporation stock; trust made QSub election so as to be able to disregard existence of C corporation (Treasury Regulations treat a QSub election as a deemed liquidation of the subsidiary, and under I.R.C. Secs. 332 and 337, the liquidation of a 100 percent subsidiary is not taxable - neither subsidiary nor parent has gain) and treat as division; appreciation in S corporation assets was $226 million and shareholders increased income tax basis in S corporation stock by like amount; taxpayer's argued that unrecognized gain be treated as tax-exempt income that subsidiary earned that passed through to shareholders resulting in basis increase; S corporate stock then sold for $230 million and shareholder reported loss on returns for year in issue; IRS determined that no basis increase should have occurred on QSub election - I.R.C. Sec. 337 does not result in exemption from income, but simply non-recognition because S corporation continued investment in subsidiary by holding assets directly rather than via stock ownership; court agreed with IRS and noted that situation not analogous to discharge of indebtedness recognized by S corporation which results in basis increase; no accession to wealth when subsidiary liquidated; no basis increase in shareholders from $15 million to $241 million upon QSub election - non-recognition of $226 million gain under I.R.C. Sec. 337 did not involve tax-exempt income so no related basis increase under I.R.C. Sec. 1367(a)(1) result was cumulative gain of $215 million on stock sale and not $11 million loss).
Estate of Richmond v. Comr., T.C. Memo. 2014-26 (decedent owned a 23.44 percent interest in a C corporation that functioned as a family personal holding company that was founded by her father; corporation held publicly-traded, dividend-producing stock and distributed all dividends, but sold nothing; stock had substantial built-in capital gain (BIG), and liquidation of corporation would trigger 39 percent capital gains tax rate (combined state and federal); issue before court was whether decedent's stock to be valued based on potential income stream derived from current investment strategy or via net asset value of stocks; either valuation approach to be combined with valuation discounts to reflect minority interest, lack of marketability and BIG tax; CPA valued decedent's interest via capitalization-of-dividends method, and produced draft report; report never finalized and decedent's interest reported on Form 706 at value of $3.15 million; IRS claims correct value is almost twice as much as reported value; after getting deficiency notice from IRS, estate hires expert appraiser; estate did not act with reasonable cause and in good faith in using unsigned draft report prepared by estate's CPA as basis for 706 value; CPA not a certified appraiser; estate later pushed for $5 million value at trial)
Madden v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 2:13-cv-00358-BLW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18509 (D. Idaho Feb. 11, 2014) (plaintiffs filed an action in state court against defendant, a railroad company, seeking a prescriptive easement for a roadway the plaintiffs used to access their property; the roadway crossed the railroad company’s property; the railroad company sought to remove the action to federal court, but the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for remand; the railroad company failed to establish an amount of controversy exceeding $75,000 so as to establish diversity jurisdiction; the railroad company failed to establish that the value of the property at issue was more than $75,000 or that its cost of compliance with any resulting injunction would be greater than $75,000; the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees).
Loving, et al. v. Internal Revenue Service, et al., No. 13-5061, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2512 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 2014), affirming, 917 F. Supp.2d 67 (D. D.C. Jan. 18, 2013) (31 U.S.C. Sec. 330 does not authorize IRS to authorize regulation of tax return preparers; during first 127 years of statute, executive branch never interpreted statute to allow such regulation; trial court held that statute and context "unambiguously foreclose the IRS's interpretation" of the statute; tax return preparer is not a "representative" of persons before Treasury Department; tax return preparer does not "practice" before the IRS; history of legislation illustrates total inapplicability to tax-return preparation which did not exist at time of enactment; Congress has already enacted a separate set of statutes applicable to tax-return preparers and if statute at issue construed as IRS desires those other statutes would be gutted; nothing in statute or legislative history indicates vast expansion of IRS's authority over hundreds of thousands of individuals in huge industry; IRS never in the past interpreted statute in such fashion or even suggest it had such authority; IRS's interpretation of statute so arbitrary and capricious that IRS position not entitled to deference).
Gorrell v. Chappell (In re Estate of Chappell), 2014 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 216 (Ill. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2014) (petitioner and respondent were the two children of the decedent; respondent was the executor of the decedent’s estate; both respondent and petitioner were granted a life estate in the decedent’s property, with the remainder to their children; at the time of decedent’s death, petitioner had three children, and respondent had none; the decedent owned a 78-acre farm at her death, but she owned few non-real estate resources to maintain the farming operation; pursuant to a clause in the will granting him permission to sell the decedent’s property without a court order, the respondent sold the farm for $561,600; the petitioner asked the court to remove the respondent as executor, arguing that he sold the farm “to get cash” and that he lacked such authority; in affirming the lower court’s order denying relief to the petitioner, the court found that the trial court did not commit manifest error; the debts and the farm expenses of the estate exceeded the value of the non-real estate property; the will granted the executor the power to sell property without a court order; the executor had received the advice of counsel that he did not need to obtain the consent of the legatees; there was no allegation that the respondent misappropriated funds for personal use).
Frye v. Kimball, No. W2013-00636-COA-R3-CV, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2014) (a father and mother executed revocable living trusts under which they each left their estates to the survivor, for life, with the remainder to the following: 70 percent to their son, 20 percent to their daughter, and 10 percent to their granddaughter; the mother survived the father, and she modified her trust to leave 70 percent of the residuary to the daughter, 20 percent to the son, and 10 percent to the granddaughter; the son filed a petition to have the mother removed as trustee of the father’s trust, and, while the action was pending, the mother died, leaving the son as the successor trustee of both trusts; the son filed a second petition alleging that he had reached a settlement agreement with his mother before her death in which she revoked the amended trust and reinstated the original one; the trial court rejected the son’s petition, finding that the settlement agreement was not enforceable because it was not signed; on appeal, the court affirmed, ruling that the modified trust was not revoked; the court also ruled that the mother clearly intended her beneficiaries to take outright and free of a lifetime trust, even though “for lifetime” language was used).
In re Webb, No. 13-1495, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2236 (8th Cir. Feb. 6, 2014) (debtors were a married couple that had entered into a joint venture and borrowed money in the name of the joint venture from a bank; the bank obtained a perfected security interest in rice grain and equipment of the debtors; when the debtors filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the trustee sought to sell the rice and equipment, but the bank argued that it was entitled to liquidate the property because it was owned by a separate entity, the joint venture; the bankruptcy court and the district court ruled in favor of the trustee, and the appellate court affirmed; the court found that the lower court did not clearly err in finding that the joint venture created by the debtors was not a general partnership or other separate legal entity; thus, the rice and equipment listed in the name of the joint venture was owned by the debtors individually and should be included in the bankruptcy estate; the joint venture agreement had specifically stated that it did not create a partnership).