Case Summaries 10/2013
(two adjacent property tracts contained a federally-protected wetland; in an attempt to alleviate flooding allegedly caused by improvements owner one made to its property, owner two’s tenant entered owner one’s property, destroyed a concrete weir, and dug a trench; the Army Corps investigated and issued a cease-and-desist order against owner one; owner one reached a settlement with the Corps, agreeing to take corrective measures to compensate for its unauthorized activity; owner one then sued owner two and its tenant for trespass; owner two filed four counterclaims, seeking injunctive relief against owner one for alleged violations of the Illinois Drainage Code and common-law trespass of water; the trial court dismissed the counterclaims, finding that they were preempted by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.; the court affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, ruling that the Clean Water Act preempted all but the portions of the counterclaims seeking damages for the value of the property lost for agricultural purposes due to trespass of water; these claims did not conflict with the Army Corps’ Clean Water Act administration action and were thus not preempted).
(tract of farmland owned in tenancy in common and partition sought with no party asserting homestead defense or entitlement to homestead rights; motion for summary judgment filed; court appointed referee to sell property and tract sold for $519,110; defendant then claimed tract was his homestead and he should be entitled to 40 acres; trial court held that summary judgment was res judicata and approved sale; court noted that homestead defense is a defense that can be waived by not being plead; defendant did not raise homestead defense in answer to partition petition and consented to summary judgment in partition action; defendant’s argument that trial court did not consider factors other than price in approving sale not raised at trial and cannot be raised on appeal; trial court decision affirmed).
(plaintiffs sold wetland easement on 283 acres to federal government for $1.23 million with plaintiffs remaining liable for property taxes on property; County Assessor assessed property at $410,480, but plaintiffs claim assessed value was only $75,000; defendant upheld assessment; on appeal, court affirmed; state law requires property to be valued at actual value for property tax purposes with ag property assessed based on productivity and net earning capacity as used for ag purposes; plaintiffs claim that tract has no value as ag land due to easement because it has no productivity as ag land due to easement; court disagreed on basis that tract still had “net earning capacity” which encompassed potential productivity; plaintiffs failed to produce evidence to counter assessor’s testimony that value accounted for easement; comparable sales given weight by court).
(debtors included a married couple and their tobacco company; debtors had been unable to operate their farm property profitably for more than two decades; in their second round of bankruptcies since 1985, the debtors sought to confirm their plans under Chapter 12; in denying confirmation, the court found that the proposed plans were not feasible because the debtors failed to show a “reasonable probability” of the success of the plans; the debtors lacked an adequate track record to make reliance upon projected income and expenses reasonable; the plans also sought to improperly eliminate the cross-collateralization of the creditor’s debt among the debtors’ residential property, farm property, farm equipment, and machinery; the proposed cross-collateralization violated 11 U.S.C. §1225(a)(5)(B)(i), which allows altering the repayment terms of the debt, over the objection of the creditor, only if the secured creditor both retains the lien securing the claim and is paid the present value of its claim).
(an owner and a purchaser entered into a contract for the sale of real property; the contract required the owner to obtain a “feedlot permit” and to assign that permit to the purchaser; the parties could not agree on the meaning of the term “feedlot permit,” and they did not close the deal; the owner, arguing the term meant only an operating permit, filed a breach of contract action seeking monetary damages and/or rescission of the contract; the purchaser argued the contract required a pollution permit and an operating permit; the trial court cancelled the contract and the appellate court affirmed; the evidence demonstrated that there was never a “meeting of the minds” as to the meaning of the essential term “feedlot permit”; as such, rescission was the proper remedy and the parties were entitled to be restored to their former positions).