Annotations 08/2012

(Chapter 7 case in which debtor seeks to hold bank (serving as trustee of family trust of which debtor is a beneficiary) in contempt for alleged violation of discharge injunction by offsetting 2010 trust distribution to debtor in order to satisfy debtor's obligation to trust for interest on a Nov. 7, 1985 note that debtor had failed to make payments on which hampered trustee's ability to make distributions to other beneficiaries; court holds that discharge injunction applies to note, but that the Doctrine of Recoupment applies to except note from discharge; offset authorized under trust law and state (KS) law; debtor's motion for summary judgment for contempt denied; summary judgment granted for other trust beneficiaries).


(plaintiff had purchased wetlands that had been previously identified by the Texas Water Division Board as a potential reservoir site to provide water to Dallas metropolitan area; plaintiff purchased property with sole intent of creating wetlands mitigation bank in order to sell wetland credits to government and private developers looking to build over wetlands (note - Sec. 404 of CWA allows developers to fill in wetlands if amount of wetlands developed is offset by preserving other wetlands); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USCOE) denied permit in 2008 on basis that creation of wetland mitigation bank conflicted with state's plans for reservoir construction; plaintiff sued state for $70 million regulatory taking on basis that state improperly interfered in permit process with USCOE (separate regulatory taking lawsuit filed against USCOE in federal court); no property right exists in federal permit at issue and plaintiff failed to plead viable takings claim).


(plaintiffs and defendants are neighbors who had a previous disagreement regarding location of plaintiffs’ fence; settlement agreement reached whereby plaintiffs and defendants were prohibited from harassing, vexing, or annoying each other; but, defendants repeatedly dumped yard waste over fence, struck the plaintiffs’ dog with a baseball bat, made obscene gestures, threatened bodily harm, and were generally disagreeable and horrible neighbors; plaintiffs brought suit alleging multiple torts in addition to breach of the settlement agreement; jury found for plaintiffs in the amount of $430,000 plus attorneys’ fees; trial court reduced the award by $80,000; defendants’ appealed; appellate court upheld breach of settlement agreement award, but overturned emotional distress damages for attack on dog; court upheld costs of veterinarian care and emotional distress from trespass to chattels damages; court overturned assault verdict due to lack of intention to commit immediate injury; court also overturned negligent infliction of emotion distress because breach of duty arose out of duty under settlement agreement for which plaintiffs were compensated; intentional infliction of emotional distress also overturned due to compensation for injuries under other counts; attorney fees upheld as plaintiffs were clearly successful party in contract action; plaintiffs’ damage award reduced to $108,000 as well as $93,760 in attorney fees).


(Chapter 7 case in which debtor seeks to hold bank (serving as trustee of family trust of which debtor is a beneficiary) in contempt for alleged violation of discharge injunction by offsetting 2010 trust distribution to debtor in order to satisfy debtor's obligation to trust for interest on a Nov. 7, 1985 note that debtor had failed to make payments on which hampered trustee's ability to make distributions to other beneficiaries; court holds that discharge injunction applies to note, but that the Doctrine of Recoupment applies to except note from discharge; offset authorized under trust law and state (KS) law; debtor's motion for summary judgment for contempt denied; summary judgment granted for other trust beneficiaries).


(I.R.C. Sec. 351 tax-free exchange case; court denied short-term capital loss deduction on sale of stock; affiliated group transaction deemed to lack economic substance; stock was determined to be non-qualified preferred stock under I.R.C. Sec. 351(g) due to lack of participation in corporate growth which meant that transaction failed to qualify as I.R.C. Sec. 351 exchange resulting in inability to deduct capital loss; taxpayer not liable for 40% gross valuation misstatement penalty, but 20% accuracy-related penalty applicable).


(married couple named son as agent under power-of-attorney (POA); upon married couple beginning to suffer from dementia, daughter moved in with them to care for them via written agreement; wife entered nursing home while husband remained in marital home and was cared for by daughter; wife's interest in home transferred to husband by son via power granted to him in POA; son later used POA to transfer husband's interest in home to daughter caregiver; husband entered nursing home and daughter sold home with proceeds of sale split between daughter and brother (POA agent); husband's application for Medicaid denied on basis that sale proceeds available to husband for purposes of Medicaid eligibility; court determined that exemption available to child caregiver applicable; exception contained in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1396p(c)(2)(A)(iv) allows children providing in-home care to disabled parents over long term can receive family home without impacting parent's Medicaid eligibility). 


(taxpayer proposed to modify installment sale contract by deferring maturity date and substituting new obligor; also proposed was change in interest rate; such alterations would not cause disposition (or satisfaction) of installment obligation that would trigger gain or loss).


(case involves motion for class certification against table grape growers in Kern County, CA for alleged violation of Ag Worker Protection Act, failure to pay wages, failure to pay reporting time wages, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to pay wages of terminated or resigned employees, etc; class certification granted and identified as all employees who worked at El Rancho Farms facilities from 11/9/2001 through 12/31/2008 and were provided noon meal break on shifts starting before 7:00 a.m.).


(defendant (tractor operator) appealed jury verdict finding plaintiff (motorcyclist) was not contributorily negligent in a tractor/motorcycle accident in which plaintiff had been drinking alcohol; appellate court agreed prejudicial error occurred when jury instruction regarding the presumption of intoxication for criminal cases was given in a civil trial; error also occurred when plaintiff’s attorney flagrantly violated motion in limine by asking questions regarding lack of DUI prosecution for plaintiff and objections failed to remove the harmful effect of hearing the statements, so error also occurred by trial court’s abuse of discretion in failing to grant a mistrial; case remanded for new trial).


(motion to dismiss suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; plaintiffs brought suit to remove county FSA office from the closure list; offices with fewer than two full-time employees that are located within 20 miles of another FSA office could be closed; because agency used wrong building in calculating distance between offices, plaintiffs argued FSA office to be closed was slightly more than 20 miles and agency was not permitted to close it; court held plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit because they had no legally protected interest in location of FSA office and failed to allege any injury because the closing will not affect their farming operation in any material manner; further, plaintiffs fail to establish any legal wrong suffered by them due to agency’s decision, there is no final agency action against them upon which they can appeal and statutes do not create any private right of action; case dismissed due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction of court).


(petitioners sought review of agency decision that individuals were reasonably connected with corporation that violated Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA); individuals reasonably connected can face bans and suspensions of employment and licensing under PACA; on review, court held substantial evidence existed that subsidiaries individuals managed for corporation did actual purchasing, negotiating, and selling of produce, so individuals could be held responsible; court also held bankruptcy filings were affirmative admissions subsidiaries were responsible for payments not made under PACA; and corporation acted as subsidiaries’ agent, so liability flowed through to individuals; petitions for review rejected).


(islands in Missouri River belong to state of Montana for financial benefit of government schools; private parties could not obtain title by adverse possession, but trial court held that state did not own riverbed and, as a result, must reimburse private parties for property taxes paid and improvements made; on appeal, court determined that state owned islands and the riverbed; Mont. Code. Ann. Sec. 77-1-102 directly on point in classifying the ownership of accreted islands; appellate court also determined that trial court erred in ordering tax and improvement reimbursement by the state - landowners can file for tax refund with county commissioners). 


(petitioner could not increase basis in two rental properties for purposes of computing gain on sale beyond amount IRS determined due to lack of evidence of improvements to property). 


(plaintiff bought three parcels of farmland in 1998 totaling 200 acres with intent to restore the land to wetlands and convert the land into a wetland mitigation bank; land preserved by permanent conservation easement and obtained approval to sell credits to developers; at time of purchase, land qualified under state law “current agricultural use valuation” (CAUV) statute for reduced tax valuation; county auditor initially approved CAUV classification for plaintiff, but reversed position nine years later; county board of revision upheld auditor’s determination; trial court reversed; on further review, court of appeals upheld trial court’s reversal on basis that statute classifies “land devoted exclusively to agricultural use” includes land “devoted to and qualified for payments or other compensation under a land…conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the federal government”; definition of “agriculture” constitutional). 


(motion to dismiss two of three remaining claims involving common law negligent misrepresentation and state Consumer Fraud Act; plaintiffs’ petition alleged plaintiffs were blueberry farmers that used defendant’s new insecticide in a “tank-mixing” process whereby insecticide and fungicide is mixed together and sprayed on plants; defendant’s failed to disclose existence of surfactant in new formation when sold to farmers; due to surfactant, blueberry plants suffered systemic injury including plant death as a result of using new formulation; court held misrepresentation and consumer fraud allegations were subsumed by the state’s product liability act and dismissed the claims under consideration).


(Chapter 7 case; after petition filed, debtor purchased cattle feed from creditor to feed cattle used in debtor's dairy business and such expense satisfied 11 U.S.C. Sec. 503(b)(1)(A) as an actual and necessary expense; creditor claimed that purchase amounts still owing were delivered during pendency of Chapter 12 case and involved transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business that qualified as an administrative expense; trustee objected; question of fact remained as to whether amount and extent of payment was consistent with past practice of parties; question of fact also existed concerning the large size of debtor's outstanding feed cost balance was consistent with ordinary course in the industry; as such, evidentiary hearing required on ordinary course of business requirement). 


(Chapter 7 case; after petition filed, debtor purchased cattle feed from creditor to feed cattle used in debtor's dairy business and such expense satisfied 11 U.S.C. Sec. 503(b)(1)(A) as an actual and necessary expense; creditor claimed that purchase amounts still owing were delivered during pendency of Chapter 12 case and involved transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business that qualified as an administrative expense; trustee objected; question of fact remained as to whether amount and extent of payment was consistent with past practice of parties; question of fact also existed concerning the large size of debtor's outstanding feed cost balance was consistent with ordinary course in the industry; as such, evidentiary hearing required on ordinary course of business requirement). 


(case involves federal historic rehabilitation tax credit (HRTC) as continued in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that is available to owners of building; plaintiff owned building in question and Pitney Bowes Corporation was partner of plaintiff (C corporations are not subject to at-risk and passive activity loss rules); IRS took position that plaintiff merely vehicle to transfer HRTC to Pitney Bowes and that all HRTCs should be reallocated to New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority; Tax Court ruled for plaintiff and allocated HRTCs to Pitney Bowes; on appeal, court reversed because Pitney Bowes did not have "meaningful stake" in plaintiff's success or failure and, as such, was not a bona fide partner in plaintiff).


(petitioner, day-trader in stocks, also operated real estate activity with wife involved in buying and selling vacant lots; over seven-year period, couple purchased over 250 lots but sold only approximately 50 lots and gave some to a church; petitioners determined to be dealers in real estate with profits subject to tax at ordinary rates and reported on Schedule C; under multi-factor analysis, sale of lots generated large gains; charitable donation reduced because taxpayer was dealer and, as such, charitable donation deduction measured by cost of property rather than market value at time of donation). 


(corporate executives entered into split-dollar life insurance policies with company in 2002; policies terminated in 2003 upon change in IRS tables at time when company had paid $842,345 in premiums and policies turned over to executives; executives paid back present value of premium recovery value based on their life expectancies resulting in payment of $131,969; IRS asserted that full $842,345 should have been reported in income; court agreed with IRS essentially viewing matter as debt forgiveness  - executives wealth increased by full amount of additional premiums paid rather than just present value of premium recovery). 


(petitioner entered into partnerships with other persons with design to buy rental properties; petitioner not named on mortgages for purchased properties; petitioner deducted mortgage interest on properties; evidence not clear as to whether titles to properties contributed to partnerships, but evidence showed that petitioner did not hold title to any properties; partnership formalities not followed; petitioner did not account for partnership existence on either 2007 or 2008 returns, but filed returns as personal owner; interest deduction not allowed’ property tax deduction not allowed; accuracy-related penalty imposed).


(case involves plaintiff’s attempt to collect from defendant for unpaid rent for leased farmland; defendant failed to timely file responsive pleading; 23 days after filing deadline, plaintiff notified defendant’s counsel of intent to seek default judgment; upon receiving no response, motion for default filed next day; defendant filed answer; three days later defendant filed answer and motions for extension of time to file answer; court allowed extension of time noting that 27 days late was only “marginal” under Eighth Circuit caselaw). 


(Chapter 12 case involving issue of debtors' eligibility for Chapter 12; debtors were married couple where husband operated a sole proprietorship horse breeding and raising business, and wife operated an S corp. marketing/consulting business; farm income test of 11 U.S.C. 101(18)(A) to be determined in accordance with IRC definition of "gross income" contained in Sec. 61; gross income of S corporation, as flow-through entity, attributable to debtors; as a result, debtors not eligible for Chapter 12 because less than one-half of their income derived from farming in year preceding year petition filed). 


(before death, decedent created revocable trust and funded it with his property; decedent later entered nursing home and received Medicaid until death; no estate administration due to insolvency of estate; state later sought to appoint administrator on basis that state entitled to reimbursement from trust assets for Medicaid benefits paid to decedent; state did not receive notice of decedent's death and, as such, one-year statute of limitations inapplicable; state law also says probate estates cannot be closed unless release filed showing that Medicaid benefits received during life have been paid; property contained in revocable trust does not shelter assets from claim of state for Medicaid recovery). 


(appeal of issuance of anti-harassment protection order entered in favor of neighbor against dog owners after dogs entered her property and killed some livestock; dog owners argued neighbor failed to established “unlawful harassment” under state statute; appellate court agreed that owners were “less than considerate dog owners” but their “irresponsible ownership” was not targeted or meant to harass their neighbor; court reversed order of protection).


(plaintiff was kicked and injured while trying to restrain a horse at large; plaintiff sued horse’s owner and landlord of property alleging strict liability and negligence; trial court granted summary judgment to defendants and also held plaintiff assumed the risk of the activity; appellate court held defendants were not subject to strict liability under state law because injury occurred on third party’s property; court found, however, that questions of fact existed regarding whether the owner breached a duty of care and whether the landlord was negligent for renting the property with defects or assuming the role of maintaining the property from which the horse escaped; appellate court also held trial court erred in finding plaintiff’s claim was barred based on primary assumption of the risk because state law provided for citizens to take and confine animals at large; case remanded).


(plaintiff owned less than 1.5 acres and defendant's ordinance prohibited the keeping of horses on such small acreage; plaintiff claimed preemption of state Right-To-Farm Law; trial court determined that plaintiff not covered by Right-To-Farm Law due to not being engaged in commercial farming operation, and granted summary disposition for defendant; appellate court affirmed because plaintiff provided no evidence of keeping horses with profit intent).


(court upholds bankruptcy court’s issuance of sanctions on debtor for filing Chapter 13 reorganization plan that court had already held was not confirmable; plan treated co-owner of farm as creditor rather than co-owner following partition action). 


(case involves defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction; defendant is MO LLC and claims to have insufficient contacts with OK to allow court to exercise personal jurisdiction; defendant entered into two contracts with plaintiff, an OK business, and plaintiff claims that defendant could reasonably foresee that it could be sued in OK; parties entered into hay purchase agreement with defendant agreeing to sell 1,200 hay bales to plaintiff for $114,000 with deliver to be at plaintiff’s business in Finley, OK; defendant delivered 102 bales as of specified delivery date and refused to refund purchase price (which had to be paid in advance); second contract entered into for 2,000 bales at $60/bale, with purchase price pre-paid, but plaintiff could pick up bales in MO; ultimately, plaintiff sued for breach of both contracts to recover pre-paid purchase price; court determines that contracts sufficient to establish that defendant has substantial connection with OK to give court personal jurisdiction over defendant; defendant did not establish that it would not be unreasonable for court to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant).


(petitioner entered into installment land contract in 2007 and gets deed to property, including home, in 2008 when petitioner took out conventional mortgage and paid off seller; petitioner claimed first-time homebuyer tax credit; IRS denies credit because purchase occurred in 2007 pre-dating existence of credit; petitioner had only had equitable title in 2007 under state (IA) law and was in possession of home and bore benefits and burdens of ownership; petitioner deducted mortgage interest and real estate taxes in 2007, again before advent of credit; IRS position upheld).


(petitioner could not increase basis in two rental properties for purposes of computing gain on sale beyond amount IRS determined due to lack of evidence of improvements to property). 


(class action filed by county government to recover damages caused by defendants’ intentional failure to record all mortgage assignments and instruments as required by state law and sought damages for unjust enrichment for utilizing MERS System instead; defendants filed motion to dismiss, which was granted; court held state law (IA) does not require a mortgage assignment to be recorded and no unjust enrichment occurred, so there is no claim upon which relief could be granted.)


(defendant created LLC to buy tract of land that would be rezoned in attempt to incentivize corporation to build poultry processing facility; land purchased and tract rezoned to allow poultry processing and other beneficial economic uses; plaintiff challenged rezoning and claimed it had standing to sue based on fact that fields on which wastewater would flow located in watershed from which plaintiff (city) obtains half of its water supply; court held that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge rezoning because tracts on which wastewater to be disbursed not subject to rezoning and sprayfields could exist regardless of existence of processing facility; plaintiff did not suffer injury from rezoning). 


(additional estate tax under I.R.C. Sec. 2057(f)(2) cannot be extended by agreement; under Sec. 2057(i)(3)(k), additional three-year period for assessment provided in I.R.C. Sec. 2032A(f) applies to additional estate tax under I.R.C. Sec. 2057(f)(2) and nothing in I.R.C. Sec. 2032A(f) says that the period can be extended by agreement). 


(court, in 2-1 opinion, strikes down EPA's "Transport Rule" (a.k.a. Cross-State Air Pollution Rule), because rule exceeds EPA's statutory authority; statute grants EPA authority to require upwind states to reduce their own significant contributions to a downwind state's non-attainment, but EPA rule could require upwind states to reduce emissions by more than their own significant contributions to downwind state's non-attainment; EPA was using rule as first part of Administration's stated goal of causing electricity prices to "skyrocket" by imposing large emissions reductions on upwind states with respect to coal-fired electricity generation plants without regard to statute; EPA also did not allow states initial chance (as required by statute) to implement required reductions with respect to in-state sources by quantifying a state's obligations and establishing federal implementation plans; dissent argued that plaintiffs lacked standing, but majority opinion thoroughly refuted dissent's standing argument).


(appellate court affirmed trial court’s summary judgment order finding plaintiffs’ claim that a forgotten water hose running for 24 hours, pooling at their foundation and causing damage was not a “sudden and accidental” occurrence covered under the homeowner’s policy).


(defendant, health care provider, utilized persons as "direct care specialists" that cared for disabled persons in group residences that the employer owned; court held, on motion for summary judgment, that such persons properly classified such persons as employees rather than independent contractors under the "economic reality" test; long-term nature of relationship noted along with large degree of control exercised over workers by employer).


(plaintiff cattle producers claimed that federal government employee acted negligently in causing their cattle to become ill and die when the employee suggested the use of particular seeds to plant on pasture land that was enrolled in a government conservation program; trial court determined that employee's conduct was discretionary under the Federal Tort Claims Act; plaintiffs claimed that seed mixture similar to Alsike Clover which is toxic to cattle; employee's role was to investigate pasture conditions and make seed mixture recommendation without regard to cost or policy interests that Congress sought to protect; trial court decision reversed because policy considerations not in issue and, as such, employee's actions not within exception discretionary exception function to Federal Tort Claims Act).


(appellate court overturned summary judgment that held quit claim deeds were unambiguous and demonstrated ownership of property to defendant; plaintiff presented other documents from defendant’s loam transaction with bank that required plaintiff and decedent to sign deeds enabling defendant to secure loan on property he was buying on contract from plaintiff and decedent; lower court erred in failing to find question of fact regarding effect of quitclaim deed under these circumstances and remanded for further proceedings; appellate court dismissed defendant’s counter claim for slander-of-title due to evidence presented.)


(debtor filed Chapter 12, but couldn’t confirm Chapter 12 plan until over a year later; under confirmation order, bank allowed two claims with one secured by personal property and one secured by real estate; debtor failed to pay on either claim and bank sought relief from automatic stay and eventually payment was made and court ordered conditional order concerning future defaults; conditional order was bilateral agreement between debtor and bank that conditioned continued effect of stay on debtor curing any default within 30 days or receiving notice of default; conditional order is not post-confirmation modification to plan; no “drop-dead” provision in original plan; conditional order is not a “plan”; conditional order anticipated chance that debtor might amend plan and such amendment would not unravel conditional order; court approved debtor’s amended motion to modify bank’s claim).


(estate executor granted 120-day extension to file Form 8939 to make I.R.C. Sec. 1022 election to allocate income tax basis increase with respect to property acquired from decedent). 


(petitioner, neurosurgeon, was sole shareholder of corporation associated with petitioner’s medical practice; corporation became union member and participated in death-benefit-only plan via trust; trust took out life insurance policies equal to death benefit for corporate employees and annually paid premiums to trust; trust issued petitioner $400,000 check denoted “loan”; purported loan not repaid; loan not bona fide, but was taxable distribution from corporation; no reasonable cause present to avoid underpayment penalty even though accountant’s advice relied on).


(petitioner claimed home office deduction; court did not take into consideration I.R.C. Sec. 280A which bars deduction for expenses incurred with respect to residence because petitioner did not satisfy depreciation requirement of I.R.C. Sec. 167 by failing to prove adjusted basis for portion of home on which depreciation claimed - no evidence of cost of home, or portion of home attributable to real estate or improvement cost; no evidence that portion of home used by petitioner's business or when home and improvements placed in service).


(petitioner, partnership, bought land for home development purposes and donated permanent conservation easement on substantial portion of property and claimed a $2.2 million charitable deduction; IRS denied deduction on basis that there was no difference in property value before and after donation; Tax Court valued easement at $560,000; IRS valuation method upheld on appeal as using an accepted method in absence of comparable sales (discounted cash-flow method); Tax Court’s approach (difference between property value before and after donation) not clearly erroneous; Tax Court decision affirmed and petitioner’s  comparable sale valuation method approach rejected). 


(case involves IRS attempt to issue penalties with respect off-shore irrevocable, asset-protection trust that plaintiff established in West Indies; plaintiff reported trust to IRS on Form 3520-A, but did not file Form 3520 which potentially subjected plaintiff to penalty under I.R.C. Sec. 6677(a) of greater of $10,000 or 35% of gross reportable amount (which would exceed $578,000); exception for penalty exists if failure to file due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect; plaintiff claimed reasonable reliance on accountant and that plaintiff lacked personal knowledge of Form 3520 filing requirements; IRS moved for summary judgment that exception to penalty did not apply; court denied motion on basis that plaintiff provided accountant with all applicable trust documents, relied on accountant to advise him on trust filings, accountant did advise plaintiff on some tax matters relating to trust, accountant prepared plaintiff's personal returns and plaintiff believed all returns had been filed; no mention of whether plaintiff failed to report trust income). 


(interest attributable to unpaid gift tax runs from due date of gift tax return; result same even if unified estate and gift tax credit would have fully offset the gift tax had gift been reported on Form 709; under facts at issue, unified credit fully utilized on subsequent gift that was reported and could not be applied against earlier gift). 


(petitioner, S corporation, was masonry contractor that furnished all labor, materials, equipment for masonry jobs; petitioner also supervised work at jobs; S corporation owned by husband and wife on 50/50 basis; S corporation would rent cranes and forklifts as necessary; all contracts noted that material and equipment belonged to S corporation; S corporation retained right to fire; S corporation contracted with others to supervise or serve as job foreman; workers paid on piecework basis every week with most workers working only for S corporation; court determined that most factors for worker tax classification favored employee status; workers held to be employees and S corporation not entitled to Sec. 530 relief; S corporation responsible for FICA, income tax withholding and penalties). 


(petitioner owned high-performance Ford Mustang which was damaged in car accident by uninsured motorist; petitioner's adjusted basis in car was $25,482 and car worth $28,500 immediately before accident and $2,250 immediately after accident (difference of $26,250); cost of repair was $18,772.79 and insurance company paid $18,522.79 to body shop; car repaired and returned to petitioner in 2007; petitioner claimed $17,287 casualty loss on 2008 return; loss disallowed initially because petitioner failed to subtract insurance reimbursement and later because loss claimed in incorrect year; 20 percent accuracy-related penalty applied).


(petitioners sought certification of water rights controversy to state Water Court; district court dismissed petition for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; appellate court overturned dismissal finding statute for when district court shall certify case to Water Court required allegations of water rights claims, water rights controversy, and inability to resolve controversy; district court erred in failing to certify controversy to Water Court).


(for donors making a charitable contribution single-member LLC that is owned by a charity, the donation is to be treated for tax purposes as if the donor made the donation directly to the charity; the contribution is considered to be a gift to a charity for disclosure requirements for quid pro quo contributions under Sec. 6115; percentage limitations also apply to the contributions; IRS suggests that charities should consider providing some type of notice that the SMLLC is either owned by the charity or treated as a disregarded entity). 


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